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I. INTRODUCTION
Canada's unique geopolitical situation has destined her
to play a significant role in the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), and North American defense. Her
3,851,809 square miles, the second largest national terri-
tory in the world, lie astride the North American continent,
flank the North Atlantic sea lanes, and separate two of the
world superpowers. Canada shares a long and virtually
undefended border with the United States which stretches
from the Straits of Juan de Fuca in the west, across the
continent, to the Gulf of Maine in the east. In the north,
Canada shares a great maritime frontier with the Soviet Union
across the frozen and hostile wastes of the Arctic Ocean.
In the aftermath of World War II the emergence and con-
frontation of two perceived coles of world power and ideology,
centered upon the United States and the Soviet Union, inspired
Canada to be a prime mover toward and founding member of
NATO. In the following decade and a half the development
of atomic weapons, intercontinental bombers and intercontin-
ental ballistic missiles highlighted the strategic importance
of Canadian territory to the western alliance, especially
the United States. Canada and the United States collaborated









on a number of cooperative defense ventures which culminated
in the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) . NORAD
was initially designed to provide warning and defense
against air attack upon the U.S. or Canada. In later years
its charter was expanded to include warning of ballistic
missile attack.
Many modern studies of Canadian defense policy have
focused upon the problems Canadian policy makers have
encountered in managing the cornerstones of Canadian defense,
NATO and NORAD . Their analyses have suggested that Canada's
participation in these organizations must be aimed at objectives
2
other than national security. McLin, for example, con-
cluded that Canadian defense policy between 1357-1963 was shaped
primarily by two non-military objectives, promotion of the
interests of the Canadian defense industry and support of
Canadian diplomacy. He argued that there were twc particu-
lar objectives of Canadian diplomacy. First was enhancing
NATO by promoting solidarity between the U.S. and Western
Europe and between Britain and France. This was accom-
plished by showing "alliance mindedness" and increasing the
incentive for other nations to fully participate in the
alliance. The second objective was attaining general influ-
ence. In the early years of NATO Canada sought to attain
2Jon B. McLin, Canada's Changing Derense Policy, 195/-
1963 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967); Colin S. Gray,
Canadian Defence Priorities: A Question of Relevance (Tor-
onto : Clarke, Irwin, 197 2) ; and Melvin Conant, The Long
Polar Watch: Canada and the Defense of North Airier ica ( New
York: Harper, 1962) .

influence by maintaining forces of such size and quantity
that their withdrawal would have severely reduced the col-
lective security of the alliance. In later years, as Europe
recovered from the devastation of World War II, the political
and economic costs of Canada's NATO contribution burgeoned.
This resulted in a shift in defense policy. The objective
of the Canadian contribution then became the cultivation of
influence within NATO through the distinctive nature of its
contribution.
One recent study of Canadian defense policy by a Canadian
author argued that the "standard" interpretations cf Canadian
defense policy formulation contained a common ma^or flaw.
They assumed that the close defense relationship between the
United States and Canada, which had been expressed through
NATO and NORAD, reflected the Canadian search for diplomatic
influence and was a permanent and immutable feature Df con-
tinental relationships. In contradistinction, Cuthhertson '
s
line of reasoning assumed that the military relationship
between the U.S. and Canada was conditional and that chang-
ing strategic circumstances had lessened the impact cf
diplomatic considerations rooted in the "continental imbal-
ance" on Canadian defense policy formulation. New opportun-
ities were thus presented in which NATO and NORAD might net
McLin, pp. 4-7
4
Brian Cuthbertson, Canadian Military independence m




be the central considerations and in which Canadian defense
policy might be formulated primarily with reference to in-
dependent military objectives.
Cuthbertson ' s work implicitly suggests the additional
possibility that non-military but uniquely Canadian concerns
might, in these changed circumstances, impact significantly
upon the formulation and execution of Canadian defense and
foreign policy. One domestic concern which might exert this
type of influence on Canadian policy formulation is tension
arising from bicultural nationalism and related issues. The
decade from 1968 to 1973 was one in which recently politi-
cized bicultural nationalism, with its roots in antagonism
between the founding French and English "solitudes", was an
issue at the forefront of Canadian domestic politics. During
this decade language laws were passed in both Federal and
Provincial legislatures, domestic violence increased drama-
tically, and diverse French-Canadian nationalist elements
were united in the politically effective Parti Quebecois with
its avowed goal to separate Quebec from Canada.
It is the thesis of this study that at least one
domestic objective, the suppression of divisive tendencies
in the Canadian body politic stemming from bicultural
nationalism, was a major determinant in Canadian defense
policy formulation between 1963 and 1973. This thesis has




changes in policy toward the traditional focal points of
defense policy, NATO and NORAD, were identified and related
with domestic concerns about bicultural nationalism. Finally,
changes in the structure, missions, and practices of the
Canadian Armed Forces were identified and related with
domestic concerns stemming from bicultural nationalism.
This research has substantially demonstrated that domestic
concerns related with bicultural nationalism were a signifi-
cant determinant in the formulation of Canadian defense policy
in the decade between 1963 and 1978. Additionally, the
escalation that occurred in the importance of this bicultural






Before the effects of bicultural nationalism on Canadian
defense policy can be ascertained, and before the implica-
tions of any change in the determinants of defense policy
for NATO and North American defense can be assessed, it is
necessary to come to grips with the concept of bicultural
nationalism. This task is easier if its components, cul-




Nationalism is the spirit of devotion co the inter-
ests, advancement, or independence of one's nation. These
interests are usually considered to be separate from those
6
of other nations or -che ramily or nations. A nation in
this context is taken in the sociological sense of a people
defined by such attributes as their common ethnic stock,
territorial association, collective personality or history,
7
and common language.' Ultimately, nationalism is subjective
Janice L. Murray, ed. , Canadian Cultural Nationalism
(New York: New York University Press, 1977), p. 45.
John Trent, "Common Ground and Disputed Territory"
in Richard Simeon, ed. Must Canada Fail? (Montreal: McGili-
Queen's University Press, 1977), p. 139. Not all of these
attributes are required to be present for nationalism to
exist nor is the list comprehensive. Additional attributes
might be common social structures, religions, etc.
12

since recognition of the unified entity of a people by its
individual members and the will among them to continue that
association are generally conceded preconditions for the
g
existence of a nation and nationalism.
In Canada two nations and hence, two nationalisms have
existed since its foundation. These are associated with the
9
French and English "Charter Groups." Over the years since
the British conquest of Canada, English-Canadian national
identification has, for a variety of geographic, demograph-
ic, and economic reasons, become more common than French-
Canadian identification and it is generally the national
identity associated with the Canadian state.
2 . Culture
Culture may be defined in a narrow or broad sense.
In the narrow sense, culture is that which is excellent in
the arts, letters, manners, and scholarly pursuits of a
society. In the broader sense, culture is the sum of the
gArend Lijphart, ed
.
, World Politics (Boston: Allyn
and Bacon, Inc., 1966), pp. 73-31. Ernst Renan in a classic
definition of nations (1382) dismissed concrete attributes
for the definition of the nation altogether and made his
definition contingent only on the subjective identification
of men with the "soul" of a nation.
9
John A. Porter, The Vertical Mosaic (Toronto: The
University of Toronto Press, 1965).
W.L. White, et al., Introduction to Canadian Government
and Politics
, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Holt, Rmehart, and Winston
of Canada, Ltd., 1977), p. 25. The association of a nation
with a state might be called political nationalism. See





values of a society reflected in the distinctive ways its
members live, think, act, and react to their environment
.
In the latter sense, national culture is implied or explicit
in most usage. In Canada two broad cultures can be iden-
tified which parallel the national identities. The coexist-
ence of these two cultures has given birth to the term
12
biculturalism.
3 . Cultural Nationalism
Cultural nationalism is the assertion, preservation,
and development by a nation of those elements of its asso-
ciated culture which establish its distinctive national
identity. Cultural nationalism has usually been a tool
for smaller nations which share major elements of language
14
or culture with larger or more important ones. In Canada
two cultural nationalisms have evolved centered on the French
and English Charter Groups. Both have had multiple feci.
French-Canadians have developed two distinctive fecal
points for their cultural nationalism. In the first instance
it has been oriented against the federal government. "' This
focus evolved from the perception in Quebec that a sound
Murray, ed., pp. 16,50.
12
In point of fact, recent Canadian policy has attemptec
to cultivate multiculturalism in a uni-national state by













economy was necessary if an infrastructure was to be built
in which French-Canadian culture might flourish. It was
recognized that the requisite funding for economic develop-
ment was available only through the Federal government, and
that acceptance of it ensured increased intervention of the
Federal government in the affairs of the Province. Since
French-Canada has always feared strangulation and resisted
Federal control over its destiny, cultural nationalism was
a natural result of economic development. Additionally,
cultural nationalism directed against the Federal government
has inescapably been associated with resistance to the m-
fluences of American and English-Canadian culture.*
The second focus of French-Canadian cultural nationalism
has been resistance to cultural domination by France. The
Quebecois milieu, as well as the patterns, intonation, and
accent of the French spoken in Quebec, are distinctly differ-
ent from those found in France. This creates economic incen-
tives for artists to appeal to a larger audience, and a
tempting social incentive to associate with the larger
Francophone Metropcle. The alternative to this dominance
is the cultivation of the language and culture of Quebec as
a distinct and vital entity formed through three and a half






, pp. 4 6 — 4^
15

context rejects the idea that the values of French culture
have greater virtue than those of cultures which have a
common ethno-linguistic heritage but independent development.
In English-Canada cultural nationalism has also had two
focal points, Great Britain and America. Canadian con-
sciousness in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
for instance, was bounded by its self-concept as an imperial
outpost: British North America. With this outlook English-
Canadian cultural nationalism was primarily directed at
excluding American influences and cultivating European,
.
. 19
especially British values. Coterminous ly a growing minor-
ity of English Canadians was attempting to develop a dis-
tinctive Canadian culture. Some saw this in terms of the
development of a common continental outlook shared with their
southern neighbor. Others believed that Canadian culture
should be distinct from American culture, embodying evolu-
tionary adaptation of British institutions and culture to a
new context and rejecting the revolutionary republicanism to
the south.
There can be no doubt that American cultural influence,
which had been significant in Canada since the Tory emigra-
tions during the Revolutionary War, was becoming increasingly
important by the turn of the century. The pattern of south-
ern settlement in Canada ensured intimate contact between the




populations of the two countries. Indeed it often seemed,
with the state of Canadian communications and the high degree
of regional isolation, that there was a greater north-south
continental identification outside Ontario and Quebec than
21
there was east-west Canadian identification. Changing
patterns in Canadian business investment encouraged an influx
22
of American capital, ownership, and management techniques.
In education, the American university system was adcpted
23
wholesale. Finally, the changing pattern or immigration
,
with its shift away from the British Isles toward the United
States and Europe, enhanced the appeal of a North American,
24
rather than British North American, identity.
The First World War was the pivotal event in the trans-
formation of English-Canada from a British North American to
an American nation. The high casualty rates and internal
divisions suffered by Canada encouraged doubts about the
wisdom of intimate relations with Europe and the Empire while
irritations with British conduct of the war furthered Car.a-
dian alienation. The conscription crisis of 1917, although
usually described in terms of English vs. French political
nationalism, provides a vivid example of this shift. While
French Canadians tended to be staunchly monarchist and to
21White, et al















value British support in preserving Canada's distinct status
in North America, they perceived their responsibilities to
the Empire strictly in terms of the defense and development
2 fi
of that portion of the Empire in which they lived. This
tradition, which had extensive support from Canadians outside
the French-Canadian community as well, had been well repre-
sented by the Prime Minister, Sir Wilfred Laurier, who had
resisted Imperial Federationalists at imperial conferences
and had proposed instead the idea of autonomy within the
Empire. Canadian participation in the Beer War was sharply
circumscribed on this basis in spice of extensive internal
and external pressures for closer imperial cooperation. In
1917 the passage of the Compulsory Civil Service Act, con-
scripting men between 2 and 4 5 for what was perceived in
many quarters as an imperial rather than North American war,
resulted in resistance Co conscripcicn and rioting in Quebec
2 fi
Ibid., p. 20. Armand Lavergne, a French Canadian
officer, for instance, told the Canadian Military Institute
in 1910:
"... I wish you Co understand that although Che French
Canadians may differ with you in many ways and means on
Che subjecC of "NaCional Defense," there is one thing
you muse not forget, and that is, that Che spiric of Che
French Canadians is Che same today as in 1775 and 1312.
The Nationalists of Quebec today are willing and ready Co
give their last drop of blood for the defence of Che
British Flag and British institutions in this country.
We are loyal just as you are, but we understand ChaC cur
duCy as Canadians, and as pare of Che Empire is Co build
up a strong Canada by preparing in Canada a strong
national defence."
27
H.J. Massey, ed. , The Canadian Military (ToronCo: Copp





in 1917 and 1918. Eventually reaction against the devi-
sive domestic effects of the "Imperial Spirit" catalyzed
Canadian rejection of close British cultural ties.
Although English-Canada rejected European encumbrances
in the aftermath of World War One and embraced her destiny
as a North American nation, the transition was not easy or
happy. A distinctly Canadian culture did not automatically
evolve, and intimate contact with the United States to the
south resulted in suspicion that, in the absence of specific
measures to encourage and nurture Canadian culture, becoming
29
North American had meant only becoming American. )ut or
this process a more complex English-Canadian cultural
nationalism emerged. While it now clearly rejected the
previous British cultural orientation, English-Canada suffer-
ed in the throes of a classical approach-avoidance conflict.
with respect to American cultural institutions.
Since 1926, the year in which Canada first, sent a mini-
ster to Washington and in which Canadian trade with che
United States first exceeded that with Great 3ritain, the
scope and complexity of economic, social, political, and
military relations between Canada and the United States
have increased dramatically. Concurrently, Canadian concern
with American cultural imperialism has been reflected in a
28William L. Langer, ed., An Encyclopedia of World
History
, 5th ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1972)
,
p. 1054.
29Murray, ed., p. 37.
19

growing number of public enquiries. In the period since
World War Two the thrust of English-Canadian cultural nation-
alism has clearly been to nurture the development of a
distinctive Canadian culture while minimizing the impact of
American institutions on that development. The earlier
anti-British focus of the twenties and thirties has been
completely overtaken by events. This new thrust has been
reflected by a growing cultural protectionism on the part of
the Canadian government. While this protectionism has beer,
positive in orientation, attempting to foster strictly Cana-
dian development, it has often been interpreted as anti-
32
American in tenor. For Canadian cultural nationalists the
intervention of the state in cultural matters is often
Parliamentary enquiries started as early as 1932.
Several Task Forces and Royal Commissions have ensued:
Royal Commission on the Arts, Letters and Sciences (1950),
Royal Commission on Broadcasting (1957), Royal Commission on
Publications (1961) , Task Force on Foreign Ownership and the
Structure of Canadian Industry (1963), Special Senate Com-
mittee on the Mass Media (1970).
31A partial list of protective actions induces
:
National Film Beard (1939), Canada Council (1957), Canadian
Film Development Corporation (1967), Amendment of Customs
Act (1965) to exclude foreign periodicals with advertise-
ments aimed at Canada, Amendment of Income Tax Act (1976)
to require 15% Canadian ownership of periodicals and 30%
Canadian (as opposed to foreign) content before advertising
was tax deductible, Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (1936),
Broadcast Act of 1958, Canadian Radio-Television Commission
(1968), Foreign Investment Review Act (1973).
32Murray, ed., p. 57.
20

cultivated to provide a further distinction from the free-
enterprise culture of the United States.
4 . Politicization
Bicultural nationalism refers to the existence of
two clearly distinct cultural nationalisms in Canada which
represent the French and English "facts" of its social his-
tory. In spite of bicultural nationalism the primary poli-
tical referent of both English and French Charter Groups has
been the Canadian State, presented by the Federal government.
Even when internal divisions over policy have occurred along
national or cultural lines, such as the Conscription Crises
and education, there has been no real suggestion, except at
the political fringes, that the Charter Groups ultimately
34
shared different political loyalties.
Within the recent past, largely as a result cf Quebec's
Quiet Revolution in the early 1960 's, a transformation of
the primary political reference of the French-Canadian nation
has occurred. For the Quebecois the primary political refer-
ent is not the Canadian nation-state stretching frcm sea to
sea, but the French-Canadian nation-state whose political en-
tity is embodied in the Provincial government and territory of






, p. 17 , n. 26
.
35Quebec, Minister of State for Cultural Development,
Quebec's Policy on the French Language (Quebec: L'editeur
Official Du Quebec, 1977), p. 51."
21

connotation of the term "bicultural nationalism" to include
the political aspects of this emerging schism in the Cana-
dian body politic. It is the threat of political schism
recently attached to bicultural nationalism which has made
this domestic issue a vital concern in the formulation of
Canadian defense and foreign policy.
B. EARLY HISTORY OF THE FRENCH-CANADIAN NATION
The successful settlement of New France (Canada) is usual-
ly dated from 1603, the year in which Samuel de Champlain
founded the settlement of Quebec. French settlers along the
St. Lawrence River and its tributaries established a relative-
ly closed rural society. The land was fertile and easily
supported subsistence farming for these settlements which
held the key to the interior of North America. In spite of
the extension of European wars to the North American colonies,
and in the case of the Seven Years War the extension of an
American war to Europe, a tough and durable French society
and pattern of life had been established by the time of the
English conquest (1759) and the cession of Canada, Acadia, and
Cape Breton to Great Britain (Treaty of Paris, 10 February 17 6 3
The French fabrique had developed a strength and homogen-
eity in the French-Canadian society. The pattern of life em-
braced conservative traditional values based upon religion and
3 6
For a superb account see Rioux, M. and Martin, Y.,
French Canadian Society
,
(Toronto: McClelland and Stewart,
1964)
. This book discusses the institutions of early Canada




the family. Authority had been vested primarily in the Roman
Catholic ecclesiastical hierarchy and, to a lesser extent, the
secular seignurial system. Passive obedience to the Bishop
3 7
and intendants had been the norm.
The French community, defined by its language, religion,
and socio-political structure, was well suited for survival
in the midst of the commercial and entrepreneurial milieu of
British North America. Initially, Quebec turned inward. The
religiously-based political ideology was deeply suspicious
of the corrupt secular state. Such secular leadership as
existed was in the hands of community notables, the doctors,
lawyers, and other professionals. The church and family,
bastions of Quebec society and values, were a bulwark shield-
ing it from dangerous modern influences and protecting its
identity. The rural agrarian tradition was cultivated while
participation in and control of commercial life was eschewed
and forfeited to English-Canadians.
3 9Politically, the identity of the French "charter group"
was protected over the course of two centuries by a series
of devices. Upon British accession of Canada in 1763, free-
dom of religion for the Roman Catholic population was
37White, et al., pp. 11-13.
3 8
James DeWilde, "The Parti Quebecois in Power" in
Richard Simeon, ed. Must Canada Fail? (Montreal: McGill-
Queen's University Press, 1977), pp. 20-22; and White, et
al., p. 13.
39
Porter, op. cit. Porter refers to the two rounding
people in Quebec as "Charter Groups," thus signifying their




affirmed. Although nothing was said about language or
ethnic origin, this was clearly an early step to recognize
that Quebec was a well-established and distinctive community
that could not be made over in the American mold. While
agitation for complete assimilation continued by the English
minority, the British authorities responded gradually to
petitions by the French populace. In 1766 the French lan-
guage gained its first official sanction in the British North
American colonies when an ordinance was passed which allowed
French-Canadian lawyers to practice in all courts and whirr.
41permitted mixed language juries. In 1771 the French seig-
nurial system of land tenure was recognized for past land
grants in Quebec and confirmed for continued use on future
42
grants of new lands. Three years later in 1774 the Quebec
Act confirmed the use of French civil law in ail of Quebec.
Although no mention of language was contained therein, the
Legislative Council mandated by the Act functioned in both
43French and English.
Thus, by 177 4, the bicuitural nature of Canada was esta-
blished and institutionalized. The religious, legal, and
40 Canada, Royal Commission on Bilmguialism and Bicultur-
alism, Report of the Royal Commission or. Bilingualism and











language attributes of both the French and British cultures
were officially sanctioned. While one might have expected
the common elements of the Western, Judeo-Christian heritage
of these two cultures to complement and support one another,
this has not been the case. Throughout Canadian history the
differences between the two cultures and the resultant ten-
sions have had far greater political significance than any
similarities
.
In 1791 the Canada Act, also known as the Constitutional
Act, partitioned Canada into Upper and Lower Canada along
language lines in an attempt to reduce friction between
44
French and English colonials. Although the tensions were
not mitigated by this legislation, the partition experience
did create a precedent for territorial definition of the
French community in Canada. In 1340, after the publication
of the famous Report on the Affairs of British North America
by Lord Durham, the Act of Union reunited Upper and Lcwer
45
Canada. Section XLI of that Act, which was repealed by
the United Kingdom Parliament in 1343, required that all
records and proceedings of the new Legislative Assembly esta-
blished by the act be in English. After the repudiation of
44,, . -Ibid.
45
Ibid., p. 46. Although there was one legislature, im-
portant matters required a dual majority, that is a majority
of both the French and English speaking legislators.
25

this measure in 1848 ail bills in the Canadian Legislative
46
Assembly were assented to in English and French.
In 1867 the British North America (B.N. A.) Act specified,
in Section 133, the legal foundation for French and English
language rights in the Federal and Quebec Provincial regimes.
Under this legislation either language was permissible for use
in legislative debates while the use of both languages in the
Records and Journals of the respective legislative bodies was
mandatory. All Acts for Canada and Quebec were required to
be published in both languages. In addition, there were
provisions in Section 133 for the use of either language in
pleading before Federal or Quebec courts, and in Section 92
for the protection of the Roman Catholic school system in
Quebec. The latter was clearly intended to provide protection
47
for the separate French school system m Quebec.
The B.N. A. Act of 13 67 is the basic document in the
Canadian constitution and it continues to be the legal foun-
dation of linguistic rights in Canada. Sections 9 3 and 13 3
of the B.N. A. Act of 18 67 may not be amended by the Parliament
48
of Canada. Although Section 133 provides linguistic
Ibid.
47
Ibid., p. 4 7; and White, et al.
, pp. 52, 18 5. In
actuality Section 93 reaffirmed existing rights for parochial
education and its wording was specifically designed to
provide protection against that for the English minority.
48 See Infra., pp. 59-60 ror a complete description or the
subsidiary parts of the Canadian constitution and why Sections
93 and 13 3 may not be amended.
26

guarantees, its scope is very limited. It is not clear, for
example, where jurisdiction with respect to language lies
within the federation from Section 133. Additionally, admin-
istrative law, proceedings in courts with attributed federal
jurisdiction, quasi- judicial bodies, and the civil service
49
are not subject to language requirements under this section.
In provinces outside Quebec, French Canadians have rarely
enjoyed even the limited protection of language rights given
Quebekers under Section 133. Manitoba had a high degree of
officially sanctioned bilingualism from its formation in
1870 until 1890 when the English Language Act (Manitoba)
created official unilinguism. Official bilingualism was
sanctioned in the Northwest Territories in 1877 by amendment
of the Northwest Territories Act. As in Manitoba this was
later reversed, again by amendment, in 1892. It is inter-
esting to note that no proclamation of the 1392 amendment
has been shown to exist. Since zhe proclamation is a legal
49Canada, Royal Commission on Bilingualism and 3ioultur-
alism, Book I, pp. 52-55.
Ibdi., pp. 49-50. Manitoba's return zc unilinguism
was caused by assimilationist and anti-Catholic sentiment
associated with new waves of immigration, by electoral re-
distribution which reduced the political voice of its declin-
ing French minority, and by the political influence of the
Orange Orders.
Ibid., pp. 50-52. The Northwest Territories' return to
unilinguism was caused by the anti-French, anti-Catholic cam-
paign which was triggered by the passage by the Quebec legis-
lature of the Jesuits' Estates Act in 1388. The latter was
associated with the political climate resulting from the North-
west Territories' rebellion of 18 8 5 and the circumstances sur-
rounding the execution of L. Riel. The political influence
of the Orange Orders was also important in this case.
27

requirement which must be fulfilled before the amendment can
enter into force, a technical argument can be made which
casts doubt upon the constitutionality of the official uni-
linguism of the Northwest Territories. Additionally, since
the Yukon Territory, Alberta, and Saskatchewan were created
from the Northwest Territories after 1892 and have never
expressly renounced bilingualism the objection to Manitoba's
unilinguism may be extended to their currently unilingual
practices.
Prime Minister Lester Pearson succinctly summarized the
essence of the Canadian social compact which prevailed through
the beginning of the Quiet Revolution in these passages from
his speech of 17 December 1962 in the House of Commons:
"Confederation. . .was an understanding or a settlement
between the two founding races of Canada made en the
basis of an acceptable and equal partnership...
To French-speaking Canadians Confederation created
a bilingual and bicultural nation...
English speaking Canadians agree, of course, that
the Confederation arrangements protected the rights of
French-Canadians in Quebec, in parliament and in federal
courts; but most felt - and I think it is fair to say
this - that it did not go beyond those limits, at least
until recently. This meant that, for all practical
purposes, there would be an English-speaking Canada
with a bilingual Quebec. What is called the 'French
fact 1 was to be provincial only..."
C. THE QUIET REVOLUTION
Traditionally, French-Canadian nationalism was concerned
with the protection of a community defined by its faith and
52 T , .,Ibid.
Lester B. Pearson, Mike, 3 vols. ed. J. A. Munro and




its language. Politically, French-Canadians sought to iso-
late Quebec and shield it from dangerous "modern" influences.
The predominant political ideology in Quebec was religiously
based and deeply suspicious of the secular state. The church
and the family were regarded as the main strongholds of
French-Canadian culture and were charged with preservation
54
of the identity of the French-Canadian nation.
Federalism was expected to provide minimal guarantees of
cultural protection. These were contained in Sections 9 3
and 133 of the B.N. A. Act of 1367 and were associated with
language and religion. Quebec's distinctive civil law, a
remnant of her French colonial origins, ensured that the
legal system would reflect the dominant cultural values of
the French-Canadian nation. Traditionally the provincial
government did not intervene directly to preserve French-
Canadian culture, but rather provided official sanction for
the church and private organizations.
The last traditional provincial government in Quebec,
headed by Premier Maurice Duplessis, was consistent in its
fidelity to the values of the past. Standing squarely for
the preservation of culture, the Suplessis government
54 George Radawanski, Trudeau (New York: Top linger Pub-
lishing Company, 1973), pp. 311-313; White, et ai., pp. 12-
14, 18, 24-25; DeWilde, p. 20; and A. Brady, "Quebec's Quiet







perpetuated old and treasured myths such as the Revenge of
the Cradle and Language as the Keeper of the Faith while
assuring English-Canada of a continuing supply of under-
educated and compliant labor. The task of the development
of Quebec was left to English-Canadian capital. It advanced
Quebec's industrialization by transferring control of re-
sources to outside interests while the Duplessis regime kept
the lid on concommitant social pressures arising frcm inuds-
58
trialization and urbanization.
In 1959 Maurice Duplessis died. His replacement in I960
by the Liberal government of Jean Lesage ushered in profound
and rapid changes in the ideological, social, political and
economic structures of Quebec which have become known :cl-
59lectively as the Quiet Revolution. This transformation,
which belatedly dragged Quebec and the French-Canadian nation
into the twentieth century, stressed and ultimately destroyed
the traditional roles of the foundations of old French cul-
ture: the state, the Roman Catholic Church, and the family.
The Church, which has traditionally been perceived as
the principal pillar of authority in Quebec because of ics
supposed influence as a kingmaker for secular governments
,
was the first casualty. Lesage eschewed alliance with the
57
Rene Levesque, "To Be Masters in Our Own House," in
W. Kilbourn, ed. Canada: A Guide to the Peaceable Kingdom
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1970), p. 243.
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DeWilde, pp. 17, 20. The social doctrines of the Roman
Catholic Church, as reflected in the Catholic trade unions,
were a source of such pressures.
59White, et al., p. 181.

Church in his campaign and maintained his independence when
elected. Lesage's government encouraged industrialization
and modernization by attracting private investment and creat-
ing a vigorous public sector. Where Duplessis' regime had
resisted social and political change in the wake of Quebec's
initial industrialization, Lesage's encouraged it and secu-
larization spread rapidly. At the private level church
attendance dropped dramatically, while at the public level
a secular education system was established.
Within a relatively short time the education system
adapted to the demands of industrialization and Quebekers
began to enjoy significantly improved skills. Where two-
thirds of all adults in Quebec had a sixth-grade education
or less in 1953, high school graduation became the r.crm over-
night. From this springboard a growing number of French-
Canadians entered the professions as well as fields of
academic pursuit, such as economics, administration, and
engineering, that had previously been the privileged domain
of English-Canadians.
As the pace of social change was accelerating in Quebec,
Canada as a whole was experiencing evolutionary social
Radwanski, p. 312.
White, et al
. , p. 181.
62DeWilde, p. 18.
Levesque, "To Be Masters in Our Own House," pp. 243-
244; and Porter, pp. 275, 278, 286.
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changes in the role of the family. Urbanization, the gener-
ally higher level of education, and the explosion of com-
munication and information contributed to a more sophisticated
64
and free-wheeling national life style. Within Quebec the
congruent decline of the Church accelerated the deterioration
of social stability associated with these changes in family
life. This change had a much greater impact in Quebec than
the rest of Canada because of this acceleration and because
of the relatively larger initial contribution the family had
made to the stability of French-Canadian society.
The Quiet Revolution spilled over into diverse areas with
synergistic effects as the rehabilitated public administra-
tion of Quebec, backed by revelations of economic growth and
a growing acceptance of the role of th state in achieving
it, undertook electoral reform and the building of modern
highways and introduced a new pension and social security
plans. Under the leadership of Lesage and his successors
Johnson, Bertrand , and Bourassa, the provincial government
played two distinct roles. First, it was used :o fcrce open
the doors of industry, forcing it to provide more jobs and
services in French, and to conduct its operations, particu-
larly advertising, in consonance with the Quebec milieu.
Second, the state came to be seen as an agent whose expansion
64 Radwanski, p. 312.
Ibid.
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would increase the economic and political power of French-
Canadians. The expansion of bureaucracy and state enter-
prises such as Hydro-Quebec vastly enlarged the avenues of






The changing role of the Quebec provincial government
was especially critical. As Quebec emerged from its cocoon,
French Canadians increasingly found themselves in direct
competition with English-Canadians for the fruits of indus-
trial society, whether they were skilled jobs or tax revenues
As they sought entry to the highest positions in the Canadian
economy, Quebekers confronted the fact that it was pre-
63dommantly owned and managed by English-Canadians. In the
midst of its revolution of rising economic expectations the
French-Canadian nation perceived that the key to its ulti-
mate potential for realization of those expectations was
held by the English-Canadian and American elites of the
69
economic structure and the federal government.
The coincidence of rising expectations, restraint of
advancement along ethnic lines, and expanding political
means resulted in an evolution in French-Canadian cultural
nationalism with far-ranging implications for the Canadian
67 DeWilde, p. 13
Ibid.
69White, et al., pp. 24-25
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state. The achievement of national cultural aspirations was
increasingly associated with the political acts of the govern-
ment of Quebec. The traditional means of cultural preser-
vation were no longer effective in French-Canada. Once
this identification was made, the politicization of French
Canadian nationalism became an inevitable development. The
legacy of the Quiet Revolution was the assertion, and growing
belief, that the French-Canadian nation required its own
sovereign state in a French-speaking homeland to secure the
safety of its collective personality.
D. DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS, 1963-1973
1. Challenge to Federalism: The Rise :f the ?arti
Quebecois
The Quiet Revolution established the conditions
necessary for the assertion of a sovereign and independent
French nation-state in Quebec. While the majority of polit-
ically active Quebekers eased toward the conclusion that a
new position must be created for Quebec in the federal system
a number of small groups began to be formed which urged
separation of Quebec from Canada. The first was the right-
wing Alliance laurentienne , formed in 19 57 by Raymond Barbeau
On the left was L'Action socialista founded in August 1960
by Raoul Ray, publisher of La Revue socialista . In Septem-
ber 1960, the most important of the early parties, the
DeWilde, pp. 20-21.
Trent, pp. 139-141; and Rene Levesque , Option Quebec
(Montreal: Les Editions De L ' homme , 1963).
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Rassemb Lenient pour 1 ' independence national (RIN) was founded.
After fierce internal battles over organization, ideology,
and leadership Pierre Bourgalt emerged as the leader of RIN
72
and its left-radical ideology.
In 19 63 the Front de Liberation du Quebec (FLQ) was
formed by a small group of Quebec radicals.' All were
veterans of previous left-wing political organizations and
the French-Canadian separatist organizations who were con-
vinced of the futility of electoral struggle and legal or
para-legal social agitation as vehicles of change in Quebec.
While laying the foundation of a clandestine revolutionary
organization the FLQ executed a program of social agitation
among workers in Montreal. At the end of 19 65 a number of
developments affecting the organization of small left-wing
parties in Quebec convinced the FLQ to abandon social agina-
tion and concentrate on revolutionary terror which would
"give the masses of Quebec both the means (ideological and
technical) and the opportunity for economic, political, and
cultural liberation."
In 19 66 the Ralliement national (RN) was created by the
merger of several conservative nationalist groups just before
72 ' -John Sayweil, The Rise or the Parti Quebeccis 196.-
1976 (Toronto: The University of Toronto Press, 197"; ,
pp. 1-8.
Radwanski, p. 3 23.
74 ....Pierre Valiieres, White Niggers or America , trans.




the provincial elections. The June elections were contested
by both the RN and the RIN. The RN ran ninety candidates
and received 3.2 percent of the popular vote while the RIN
ran seventy-three candidates and received 5.6 percent of the
vote.
On 18 September 1967 a veteran member of the Liberal
Party of Quebec (LPQ) and a former minister in the Lesage
government, Rene Levesque, spoke to his riding association
in Montreal Laurier for three hours reviewing the history of
English-French relations and concluding that Quebec should
seek independence from Canada, followed by economic union.
The speech was published in Le Devoir September 19-21 and
became the basis for the debate about federalism at the :cn-
76
vention of the Quebec Liberal Federation m October.
Levesque ' s stance was repudiated by the Liberals and he
subsequently resigned from the party to found the Mcuvemer.t
Sourveramete Association (MSA) in November of 1967. This
development complicated the already complex situation sur-
rounding French-Canadian political nationalism. The movement,
if it could be called that, was ideologically fragmented
along the entire left-right spectrum and the two major
coalitions, RN and RIN, were riddled with internal disputes.
Within a year Levesque had managed to forge a single movement
from these elements unified by its dedication to objectives





state and the negotiation of a treaty with Canada for an
economic association in the form of a tariff and monetary
union. The Parti Quebecois (PQ) was born in Quebec City,
11-14 October, 1968, from the ashes of the RN, RIM, and MSA.'
The new French-Canadian nationalism which developed
under the cultivation of the PQ was distinctly different
from traditional forms and extended the transformations of
the Quiet Revolution. The new nationalism was intimately
associated with the growth of a French middle class and
accepted the logic of social and economic modernization:
Quebec had to be a fully "North American" society. Instead
of being inward-looking and attempting to isolate French and
English in separate spheres, the new technocrats were
activists: they sought an expanded political frame of refer-
ence and penetration of all sectors of modern econcmic life.
Quebekers wanted to develop new forms of competition with
English-Canaaa
.
The new nationalists wanted to challenge Ottawa directly
to recover powers ana revenues. Levesque spoke cr a
"sclerosis of Canadian institutions", caused by conflicting
attempts of federal and provincial governments tc enforce
overlapping laws and regulations, benefitting different
8










traditional suspicion of the state with a belief that Quebec's
strong/ centralized state was the best instrument for sur-
8 1
vival and development.
The PQ leadership argued that reconciliation between Quebec
and Canada was impossible. The basic, bare-minimum terms which
were demanded by the French-Canadians far exceeded the best
3 9 *"
intentions of English-Canada. Levesque argued that Canadian
federal institutions were so fragile that any attempt by a
Prime Minister to meet Quebec's minimum requirements would
shatter the Confederation. In his estimation, and char of
other PQ leaders such as Jacques Parizeau, the federal govern-
ment had already been decentralized to such an extent that
major revisions were required to build central authority if
it were to survive. Hence the vital interests of Quebec and
3 3
Canada were perceived to be diametrically and immutably opposed.
The PQ contested provincial elections in Quebec in 1970,
1973, and 1976. Its initial appeal was confined tc working-
class constituencies in urban areas such as East Montreal.
By developing the variety of issues to which it spoke and
by mobilizing a militant, young, idealistic and highly
81 *Levesque, "To Be Masters in Our Own House", p. 24 6.
82
"Trent, p. 141. The demands included: jurisdiction
over its economy, social security and welfare, culture, in-
ternational relations, citizenship, immigration and employ-
ment, massive transfer of fiscal resources, and restructured
federal institutions.
83
Trent, pp. 140-141; and Levesque, "To Be Masters in
Our Own House," pp. 245-250.
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resourceful grass roots movement the initial constituencies
34
were steadily expanded. In 1970 the PQ garnered 23 per-
cent of the popular vote and seven seats of 108 in the
8 S
National Assembly. After the initial disappointment of
this showing, the PQ began to regroup and prepare for the
next elections.
In the intervening months events both hindered and
assisted the PQ. One event which really hurt was the Octo-
ber Crisis of 1970. Since its beginning in 1962 the bomb-
ings, holdups and other terrorist activities associated with
the FLQ had steadily expanded. Between 1962 and 1967 the
FLQ had planted approximately 3 5 bombs and perpetrated eight
holdups. Between 1968 and 1970 the numbers had mounted to
approximately 55 and 20 respectively. In 1969 a single FLQ
bomb detonation at the Montreal Stock Exchange had caused
217 injuries and by the fall of 1970 six lives had been
... 86
claimed oy FLQ activities.
On 5 October 1970 British Trade Commissioner James Cress
was kidnapped by a cell of the FLQ which demanded the re-
lease of 123 prisoners,- the payment of a large ransom, and
the publication of their manifesto. As the deadline was
reached for those demands, on 10 October, another FLQ cell
kidnapped Pierre Lapcrte, Quebec's Minister of Labor. On
DeWilde, p. 16.
8 5 Saywell, p. 44.
Q C
Radwanski, p. 3 23
39

12 October the Prime Minister called troops to Ottawa to
assist civil authorities (the RCMP ) in protective and secur-
8 7
ity duties. On the 15th, following a declaration the
previous day by several prominent Quebec citizens which in-
dicated a lack of will to resist the deterioration of civil
order in Quebec, the attorney general of Quebec requested
federal troops, under the provisions of the National Defense
Act, to provide aid of the civil power to assist Quebec's
Provincial Police and maintain order. On the following
day, following receipt of letters from Quebec provincial
authorities and Montreal municipal authorities, the War
Measures Act was invoked after a perfunctory debate in Par-
89liament. On 18 October, as negotiations dragged on, Pierre
Laporte was murdered causing an extensive civil uproar. The
crisis was finally terminated on 3 December when Cress was
located and his release, in exchange fcr the deportation cf
* u 9several criminals to Cuba, was secured.
The October Crisis galvanized opiniion against separatist:
of all ilks by identifying ultra-radicalism with ultra-
91
nationalism. While it was a dennite setback ror the ?Q,
its effects were all but overcome by the end of 1971. A
8 7 Guy Morchain, "Peace-Keeping At Heme," Sentinel , '7c'.
7, no. 2, (February-March 1971): 2.
8 8
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particularly grisly confrontation between police and trade
unionists in front of the newspaper La Presse on the night of
29 October 1971 resulted in one death, over 70 injuries, and
about 30 arrests. The effect on the formerly moderate por-
tions of the trade union leadership in Quebec was dramatic
and the PQ finally collected endorsements from the Federation
des travailleurs du Quebec (FTQ) , Confederation of National
Trade Unions (CNTU) , and Corporation des enseigr.ants du
92Quebec (CEQ)
,
Quebec's most influential unions.
In spite of these developments the PQ did not triumph in
the 1973 provincial elections. In a straight two-party fight,
which pitted the Liberal premise of cultural sovereignty
against the PQ promise of political sovereignty and which
hinged on sensational exploitation of speculation about the
consequences of political separation, the PQ gained thirty
percent of the popular vote but collected only six seats in
93
the National Assembly.
In 1974 the PQ weathered an internal leadership crisis
which turned upon disagreements over organization, tactics
and Levesque ' s leadership before settling into opposition
94
again. in September and October a reappraisal was mace or
the party platform and it was modified at the PQ convention
in November to provide for consultation by referendum in the
92
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process of acquiring sovereignty and a new constitution. The
95
road to independence was to be undertaken m stages.
1975 was a quiet year for the PQ marked only by the con-
tinuing dialogue between radicals and moderates within the
party over tactics. As it entered 1976, the PQ began to
mobilize support over an increasingly broad front in the
wake of disasters for the Bourassa-led liberals.
Since 1973 inflation had seen the cost of the James Bay
development - a project personally identified with Bcurassa -
escalate in cost over 3 00 percent in five years with no end
in sight. Additionally, Quebec had been forced to pick up
most of the pieces when the cost of the Olympics escalated
96
from $250 million to almost $1.5 billion. Workers were
alienated from the Bourassa government by its anti-union pol-
97icies and the high rate of unemployment. The Bourassa
government had been elected on a platform which coupled cul-
tural sovereignty with renewed federalism. The key to its
cultural policies was Bill 22 on the French language. By the
summer of 197 6 the entire system established by the Bill to
regulate the language of education was in disarray. Anglo-
phones and immigrants attacked the government on the provi-
sions which eliminated freedom on choice in determining the
language of instruction of children and established the
9 8












In June 1976 a work stoppage by pilots to protest the
earlier decision of the federal government to extend the use
of French for air traffic control at Quebec airports resulted
in a reconsideration of the policy and a prohibition against
the use of French. This episode precipitated a bitter reac-
tion in Quebec and an ugly backlash against bilingualisn
99
across the country. On 13 October James Richardson resigned
from the Trudeau cabinet in protest over the possible en-
trenchment of French language rights in a new constitution
100
over which Quebec would have a veto. In a statement the
same day, Rene Levesque highlighted the apparent inability
of the federal government or the Liberal program to protect
the language rights of French Canadians. Reviewing the recent
events, he said they were a:
"warning that the cup is full and that any attempt to
impose more French will provoke a violent re;ect:cn from
the English-speaking majority. Because that is plainly
what is involved - from initial curiosity to resistance,
English Canada is moving now to rejection. Without
openly wishing that Quebec would leave, not going sc far
as to push us out the door if we dcn't decide to jo, it
is certain that English Canada is no longer in the mood
to tolerate either the smallest concession to Quebec or
any acceleration of bilingualism in Canada ." ^-°-
On 18 October 197 6 Premier Bcurassa announced that elec-
tions would be held on 15 November. Bourassa argued that he
99
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letters to editors outside Quebec, but when Toronto fans
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needed a mandate on two issues: the form of a new consti-
tution and limitation of the right to strike in the public
102
sector. The Bourassa program proposed a concept of con-
stitutional reform that would have provided cultural
sovereignty with constitutionally enshrined protection and
greatly enlarged the revenues flowing to Quebec. He
attempted to focus the attention of the electorate on
separatism, but the 1974 revision to the PQ program pro-
viding for separation by stages largely defused the issue.
The ineptness and corruption of his own administration be-
came the main issue along with the inability of his admin-
istration to make the keystone of the cultural sovereignty
program, protection of the French language through Bill 22,
work. The Liberal campaign was further aff ected by
recent changes in federal dairy policies which appeared tc
provide benefits for Ontario consumers at the expense of
Quebec's dairy farmers. Provincial-federal relations were
viewed in a politicized national context. The expansion cf
federal activities in regional development and cultural
affairs appeared consistently to place Quebec in a back sea-
compared to prosperous Ontario. The fact that Ottawa con-
tested every Quebec request for development funds created
102xu
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DeWilde, p. 17. The Bourassa government had launched
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back compromising information on several members of the
government and the way the government did business.
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further doubts about the ability of Mr. Bourassa to ensure
104
cultural survival in a federal system of any sort.
The Parti Quebecois won a stunning victory on 15 November
1976. In addition to their old urban working class consti-
tuencies they swept the rural areas, middle class, and
frontier industrial areas such as Lac St. Jean. The PQ
collected 42 percent of the popular vote and 71 out of 110
seats in the National Assembly. Outside of Quebec, Canada
reeled in shock and attempted to convince itself that the
vote was not a vote for separation, but a vote for honest
government in reaction to a discredited and corrupt regime.
The reality however was that a government had come to power
in Quebec which was committed to attain independence and
create a new association between Canada and Quebec and which
enjoyed all the levers of public persuasion and executive
authority resident in a parliamentary democracy.
The Levesque government moved rapidly to assert its
authority and reaffirm its commitment to the basic aims of
its campaign program. On 13 December at the first ministers
'
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only a minority of the PQ votes may have been for indepen-




conference at Ottawa and again in a speech to the Economic
Club of New York in early 1977, Rene Levesque reaffirmed the
commitment of his party to achieve a mandate for sovereignty
and a new form of economic association with Canada.""
There were three primary thrusts to Levesque ' s cultural
policies. First, he attempted to document and publicize the
demographic threat to the French-Canadian nation. Second,
he attempted to document and publicize the threat to the
primary cultural asset of the French-Canadian nation, its
language. Finally, he attempted through his language legis-
lation to assert that Quebec would be a society which would be
unilingual and whose unilinguism would enhance the develop-
ment of its distinctive culture, economy, and stace
.
Two demographic trends derived from the decennial Canadian
108
census were of interest in this regard:
- French language use was concentrated in luebec , north-
eastern Ontario, and northern Mew Brunswick. The
French language was virtually a dead ietrer fcr Cana-
dians outside a line drawn from Sauit Ste. Maria to
109
Moncton.
- The birthrate among Francophone families was dropping.
The situation was most serious in the seven provinces
107_,Simeon, p. 2.
108
The census is useful in this regard since it contains
two questions associated with language, and one associated
with ethnic origin.
109 Richard J. Joy, "Languages in Conflict: Canada, 1976, "
The American Review of Canadian Studies , Vol. VI, no. 2,
(Autumn 1976) : 7-9.
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west of Ontario and east of New Brunswick. In those
areas there were less than 25,000 Francophones in the
5-14 year old population group in 1971, 1.7 percent of
the total year group population.
The declining trend for French language use outside of
Quebec shown in this data was explained primarily by the
assimilation of Francophones to the English language. A
subsidiary factor was the internal immigration of Franco-
Illphones to Quebec. The Francophone birthrate did not seem
to pose a serious threat to the position of the French lan-
guage in Quebec, but it did have serious implications with
respect to the position of Quebec within Canada. Canada,
from this data, appeared to be forming two distinct poles of
English and French language population separated by a tenuous
band of bilingualism in northern New Brunswick and along the
Quebec/Ontario border. The strength of the French language
in Quebec was maintained through the influx of Francophones
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Wendie Kerr, "Bilingualism failing, Howe report indi-
cates," The Globe and Mail (Toronto), 7 September 197S; and
Paule des Rivieres, "Le Canada parait se diriger vers deux
unilinguismes , " Le Devoir (Montreal), 7 September 1973, p. 1,
112 Joy, "Languages in Conflict: Canada, 1976," pp. 20-
20A; and Canada, Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Ricul-
turalism, Book I, p. 21.
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The PQ government utilized data such as this to establish
an image of Quebec as a French nation-state besieged and
challenged culturally by the remainder of the North American
114
nations. French language and culture in Quebec were por-
trayed as jeopardized by declines in the number of French
speaking Quebekers, economic subjugation of Francophones,
Anglophone acculturation of immigrants, and the corruption
of the French language, the primary vehicle of French
culture and values.
The PQ government asserted chat the primary political
reference for the Quebecois was the French-Canadian nation and
its political incarnation in the government and territory of
11 fiQuebec. Thus the primary task undertaken by this levesque
government was the rejection of bilingualism and the compre-
hensive development of a distinct French-Canadian national
culture. To achieve this objective Bill 131, The Charter
of the French Language, was passed to supercede Bill 22, The
Official Language Act of 1974. Bill 131 declared that French
was the official language of Quebec and disallowed the legal
114Quebec, Minister of State ror Cultural Development,
Quebec's Policy on the French Language , (Quebec: L'eciteur
Official Du Quebec, 1977), pp. 4-5, 31.
Ibid., pp. 8-27. Some of the demographic data cited
in other works suggests that the M.O.S.C.D. assertions may
be overstated. Contradictory statements which stress the
vital and non-corrupt status of French in Quebec appear in










standing of the English language in the province. The bill
mandated the use of the French language in the legislature,
courts, civil administration, public utility firms, pro-
fessional corporations, private enterprise, elementary and
118
secondary schools. A public administration was establish-
ed to enforce the legislation under the civil jurisdiction.
Fines of up to $5000 per offense or $2000 per day could be
119
assessed under this act. Like its predecessor, Mr.
Levesque ' s language bill raised hackles and protests frcrr.
minorities in Quebec. Unlike its predecessor, this law
prompted drastic reaction from large economic concerns in
120
the province. It also engaged the interest of the federal
government and found its way into early challenges in the
121
courts. In response to this reaction, the ?Q government
eased the arbitrariness of its implementation of Bill 131
slightly and launched a renewed effort in late 1973 to promot;
118 Quebec, Assemblee Mationale Du Quebec, Bill 101 Chaj
ter of the French language (Quebec:
Quebec, 1977), pp. 1-3.
119 Ibid., p. 39.
120 Peter Brimelow, "Quebec's Language Law Puts Companies
to Flight," The New York Times , 23 April 1978, ?. 3F; and
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Reaction to Bill 22," The American Review of Canadian Studies
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the benefits of sovereignty-association. In 1978 the
Levesque government also tabled a bill which provided a
referendum procedure for Quebec and announced that it would
seek authority in late 1979 or early 1980 to negotiate terms
123
for separation.
2 . The Federal Response
The challenge of the new French-Canadian nationalism
which evolved from Jean Lesage's Quiet Revolution was, pro-
perly speaking, a challenge to the federal institutions of
the Canadian state even though its political battles were
fought at the provincial level. The man who initiated
Canada's federalist response was Lester Pearson. Pearson
had addressed the evolving situation in Quebec publicly as
early as November 1961 while leading the Liberal opposition
to Prime Minister John Diefenbaker ' s Conservative govern-
124
merit. Pearson perceived the central importance or the
changed situation in Quebec for Canadian national unity. On
17 December 1962, while still in opposition, he made a ma;cr
non-partisan speech in the House of Commons in which he re-
viewed the evolution of the relationship between the founding
122 Robert S. Cameron, "Quebec Sets Forth Rules tc Soften
Its Push for Head Offices of Firms to Use French," The Wall
Street Journal , 21 July 1978, p. 15. A large number of"
pamphlets has been issued in this effort. Two are "Souver-
ainete-Association" by the PQ and "Le Quebec, sen territoire,
ses resources" by the Government of Quebec.
123Frederick Rose, "Quebec's Ruling Party Appears to
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races and advocated the formation of a Royal Commission to
investigate how bilingualism and biculturalism might be drawn
125
upon as the bases for national development. His apprecia-
tion of the Quebec situation was remarkably accurate:
"...It is now clear to all of us, I think, that French-
speaking Canadians are determined to become directors
of their economic and cultural destiny in their own
changed and changing society ... they also ask for equal
and full opportunity to participate in all federal
government services, in which their own language will
be fully recognized. This right flows from the equal
partnership of confederation."-'--"
Pearson's concern for national unity did not dissipate
when he came out of opposition. When he took office as Prime
Minister on 22 April 1963 he was committed tc forming a Royal
Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism and tc consider-
ing with the provinces constitutional reform tc strengthen
12 7
"co-operative federalism." ' Pearson thought that the prob-
lem of national unity embraced such factors as the constitu-
tion, federal-provincial relation, tax-sharing, and
equalization grants. However, he considered the problems
of language and culture to be pre-eminent among all the elements. 129
125 T,.,Ibid.
12 6
Ibid., p. 68. Pearson's insight was undoubtedly
sharpened by his assistant Maurice Lamontagne who drafted
the speech for him.
127 Ibid., pp. 77,34. Pearson's "co-operative receraiism'
is often referred to as decentralization.
128Equalization grants are a direct transfer of revenues
from the federal government to the provinces to establish a
minimum standard of social services for all citizens.
129
Pearson , Mike, Vol. Ill, p. 237.
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a. The Royal Commission on Bilingualism and
Biculturalism
Within six months after he took office, the cen-
terpiece of Pearson's attempt to build national unity was in
place. The terms of reference for the Royal Commission on
Bilingualism and Biculturalism were issued on 19 July 1963
and the Commission led by Andre Laurendeau of Montreal and
Davidson Dunton of Ottawa began research for its hearings
immediately. In January of 1964 the Director of Research,
Michael Oliver, was in place and Professor Leon Dion of
Laval University was appointed as the Special Consultant on
Research. Over 125 studies were prepared for the Commission
by eminent scholars. Their scope was immense, covering
topics such as the official languages, the work world, edu-
cation, arts and letters, other cultural groups, the mass
media, government: institutions, voluntary associations, con-
132
stitutional problems, and foreign comparisons. Over 350
briefs were submitted to the Commission by individuals,
associations, and organizations. These briefings were
presented and discussed in public hearings at ten different
sites between March and December 1965 . They followed region-
al meetings in 1964 during which time the Commissioners
Canada, Royal Commission on Bilingualism and BicrL
turalism, Book I, pp. 173-174.






listened to several thousand Canadians express their atti-
134
tudes on the Commission's terms of reference.
The Commission published A Preliminary Report
,
based only upon the regional meetings in February 1965. The
main Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Bicultur -
alism was published in five books commencing 3 October 1967.
In the Preliminary Report the Commission concluded that
"Canada, without being fully conscious of the fact, is
136
passing through the greatest crisis in its history." They
asserted that Canada was facing "a time when decisions must
be taken and developments must occur leading either to its
breakup, or to a new set of conditions for its future condi-
tion." In the final Report , the Commission concluded,
1 33
"This is still the condition. "
"
J
b. Early Language Policy
The Report caused an uproar in Canada which
Pearson had expected. He wanted Canadians to be shocked and
to understand that there were hidden cracks
134
Ibid., p. 174. Four of the briefings presentee to
the Commission were confidential ar the request; of the brief-
ers who desired to remain anonymous.
Publishing of these books was not completed until 197
and one of the major reports, Book III on The Work World was
not published until September 1969.
Canada, Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Bicultur-







13 8 Canada, Royal Commission on 3ilingualism and Bicultur-
alism, Book I., p. xvii.
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with differences serious enough to destroy Canada if no
139
remedial action were taken. Pearson did not intend to
wait for the complete publication of the Royal Commission's
work to begin attacking the language problem. On 6 April
1966 he made a major statement of policy respecting bilin-
140gualism in the public service. This policy dictated that
bilingualism, or the willingness to achieve it at government
expense, would be an element of merit considered in the
selection of university graduates for entry level positions
in the public service. Additionally a special program was
established for senior executive officers, language trainir. :
programs were expanded and strengthened, and a special
secretariat on bilingualism was established within the Privy
Council Office to ensure the coordinated and progressive
]
4"
implementation of the government's policy and program.
Because of his programs, Pearson was often criti-
cized as a believer in two nations. While he firmly believed
that the French in Canada were a nation in the sense of
being a separate people, Pearson always stressed that two
142political nations could not exist within one country. His
approach to constitutional reform bore this out.
Pearson, Mike , Vol. Ill, p. 241.
140Canada, House or Commons, Debates , 6 April 1976, pp
3915-3923.
141 T , .,Ibid.
142Pearson, Mike, Vol. Ill, pp. 237-238.
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c. The Canadian Constitution
Canada is a federation of ten provinces and two
territories governed, under constitutional authority, by a
parliamentary system akin to that of the United Kingdom.
Power in the government is divided between the Executive,
Legislative, and Judicial branches. In the Executive branch
power is vested in the monarch who is represented by the
Governor General. Executive power is exercised by the Prime
Minister and his cabinet acting as a committee for the Privy
Council. Legislative authority is exercised by a bicameral
parliament composed of a Senate and House of Commons. The
provincial governments' Executive and Legislative branches
generally parallel those of the Federal government in struc-
ture and in function in their areas of competence. The
Judicial branch, in contrast, is a vertical structure in
which the Federal and provincial courts form a unified hier-
archy. On the Federal level are the Supreme Court of Canada
and the Federal Court of Canada, the latter consisting of
143
two divisions, Trial and Appeal. In principle, the pro-
vinces share equal constitutional power and status, yet
differential treatment of provinces under the constitution
exists. Senatorial representation varies from province to
province; public lands are retained by the Federal government




(Toronto: The University of Toronto Press, 1963),
pp. 61-514; and Canada, Department of External Affairs, The
Constitution and Government of Canada , Reference Paper No.
70, (1975), pp. 1-12. Table one provides an overview of the




CHRONOLOGY OF CANADIAN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT
1763 - Treaty of Paris. British accession of Canada.
1766 - French language sanctioned for court proceedings in
Quebec
.
1771 - French seigneurial system of land tenure reaffirmed
in Quebec.
1774 - Quebec Act. French civil law confirmed in Quebec.
1791 - Canada Act. Territorial partition along language
lines
.
1840 - Act of Union. Partition ended.
1867 - British North America (B.N. A.) Act. British statute
which created the Dominion of Canada. Basic document
of the Canadian constitution.
1875 - Dominion Act. Canadian organic statute which created
the Supreme Court of Canada.
1927 - Unsuccessful attempt to patriate the Canadian
constitution.
1931 - Unsuccessful attempt to patriate the Canadian
constitution.
1931 - Statute of Westminster. British statute which aug-
mented Canadian autonomy while leaving the issues of
patriation and amendment outstanding. Part of Cana-
dian constitution.
1935 - Unsuccessful attempt to patriate the Canadian
constitution.
1949 - B.N. A. Act amended to allow partial amendment by
Canadian Parliament.
1950 - Unsuccessful attempt to patriate the Canadian
constitution.
1964 - Fulton-Favreau Amending Formula. Unsuccessful attempt
to patriate the Canadian constitution.
1968 - Formation of continuing Constitutional Conference.
1971 - Victoria Charter. Unsuccessful attempt to patriate
the Canadian constitution.
1978 - Constitutional Amendment Bill. Two-phase attempt to
patriate the Canadian constitution, provide a new
amending procedure, enshrine language rights, redress
regional representation in the Senate, and clarify
the executive structure. Results pending.
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in Alberta, Manitoba, and Saskatchewan; and the French lan-
144
guage is protected in Quebec.
The distribution of power between the Federal and
provincial governments is based upon the written distribution
of legislative authority in the constitution. Specific
grants of exclusive Federal and provincial legislative
authority are made; concurrent authority is granted in the
area of immigration and agriculture; and the Federal govern-
ment enjoys the right of intervention in the general pro-
vincial authority over education. Residual powers are vested
in the Federal government and interpretation of competence
is performed by the Supreme Court. By custom and judicial
interpretation the distribution of executive authority
145follows that of legislative authority.
The Canadian constitution, while generally con-
ceded to be written, cannot be identified as a single document
and indeed has significant unwritten, conventional sources.
The most important instrumentalities of the Canadian constitu-
tion are British statutes, British Orders in Council passed
under statutory authority, British Letters Patent, Canadian





146 Ibid., pp. 61-89.
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British statutes which form a portion of the
Canadian constitution include the British North America Act
of 1867 and its amendments and the Statute of Westminster of
1931. The former created the Dominion of Canada while the
latter augmented its autonomy. British Orders in Council
passed under statutory authority accomplished the admission
of Rupert's Land, the Northwest Territory, British Columbia,
and Prince Edward Island to the Dominion, while British Let-




Canadian constitutional statutes, such as the
Alberta and Saskatchewan Acts are those statutes of the
Canadian Parliament of a constitutional nature which cannot
be amended by it once enacted. Canadian organic statutes on
the other hand contain no special provisions to distinguish
them from other acts of the Parliament but are recognized by
their content. An example of this genre is the Dominion Act
of 1875 which created the Supreme Court of Canada. Finally,
Canadian conventional practices are those unwritten proce-
dures which supplement and modify the written constitution.
Most of the principles which govern the structure and func-
tioning of the Executive branch fall into this realm. Included
amongst these are the principle of responsible government,
the mechanics of government succession and the roles of the
14 8





(1) Amendment and Patriation . Although Canada
is fully recognized throughout the world as an independent
federal state, the formal power to amend certain portions of
her constitution still resides with the Parliament of the
United Kingdom. This anomalous situation persists because
of the inability of governments in Canada to reach agreement
upon a formula for amendment of certain key areas of the
4.-*. 4." 149constxtution.
The Balfour Report of 1926 enunciated the
principle of equality of status between the United Kingdom
and Canada subsequently embodied in the Statute of Westmin-
ster of 1931. The latter established the equality and inde-
pendent status of Canada. Two attempts were made in the
interim to patriate the British North American Act (BNA) . At
Dominion-Provincial Conferences in 1927 and April 1931 no
agreement could be reached on an amending formula. On 3
June 1931 the Prime Minister introduced a resolution, which
was subsequently passed by Commons and the Senate, and for-
warded to London which requested that the BNA Act be exempted
in the Statute of Westminster from those terms which removed
the authority of British legislation.
In 1935 neither a House of Commons special
committee nor the Dominion-Provincial Conferees were able to
devise an amending formula which could be adopted. In 194 9,
149Canada, Government of Canada, The Canadian Constitu-







under the leadership of Louis St-Laurent, an important ini-
tiative was taken to establish those areas in which Parlia-
ment, acting along, might amend the BNA Act. Subsequently
the BNA Act was amended pursuant to an address passed by
both houses of Parliament to grant to the Parliament of Can-
ada the power to amend the Constitution of Canada, with cer-
tain exceptions. It remained necessary for the British
Parliament to adopt legislation to amend the BNA Act with
respect to the following matters
:
(a) the distribution of legislative authority.
(b) the rights and privileges constitutionally granted
to the legislatures or governments of the provinces.
(c) the rights and privileges granted to any class of
persons with respect to schools,
(d) the use of the English or of the French language.
(e) the requirement that there be at least one session
of Parliament annually; and that no House of Commons
continue for more than five years from the day of
the return of the writs. 1^1
In 1950 a fifth attempt was made to patriate
the constitution by the convening of a Constitutional Con-
ference. It was suspended because of the Korean conflict
and not resumed thereafter. A sixth, and likewise unsuccess-
ful attempt to find an amending formula was inaugurated in
152July 19 60 at the Dominion-Provincial Conference.




d. Pearson and Constitutional Amendment
Lester Pearson's approach to constitutional
amendment was based on his conclusion that decentralization
of power through joint undertakings with the provinces,
"co-operative federalism", was the way to establish,
strengthen and maintain national unity. His commitment
to constitutional reform was largely based upon his percep-
tion that if Canadians "failed to contain and destroy separ-
atism by coming to terms with the Quiet Revolution. . .we would
have the gravest difficulty in holding our country to-
gether." His concepts for constitutional amendment re-
volved around special recognition of the French fact and the
rights of French-speaking Canadians in confederation, new
tax-sharing arrangements, and a new division of authority
between the federal and provincial governments which clari-
155
fied ambiguous areas in the original constitution.
Pearson was fully aware of the particular sensi-
,
156
tivity of French-Canadians to constitutional amendment.
French-Canadians had been largely responsible for the re-
servations enumerated in the addition of Section 91(1) to
the BNA Act in 1949. Wary of placing constitutional provi-
sions seen as vital to national survival in the hands of the
153 Pearson, Mike , Vol. Ill, pp. 238-239
154_. . ,
Ibid.
155 Ibid., pp. 240,254.
156 Ibid., pp. 246-251.
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English-speaking majority. Quebec had ensured that this
authority remained with the British Parliament. Since pro-
posed amendments were required to be submitted to the British
Parliament by the federal government in consultation with
the provinces, Quebec retained a veto over proposals affect-
xng her vital interests.
In 1964 Pearson launched the first of his two
attempts to revise Canada's constitution. At the Charlotte-
town federal-provincial conference in October, Premier Manning
of Alberta, on behalf of the premiers, informed Pearson of
the belief that general agreement could be reached on the
basis of the 1961 proposal. Agreement in principle was
reached on an amending procedure called the Fulton-Favreau
158formula and it was referred to the provinces for action.
The Fulton-Favreau formula was drafted in the
form of an Act and like previous proposals was a complex
prescription. All amendments were to take the form of an
Act of the Parliament of Canada, subject, in a wide range of
matters, to the concurrence of provincial legislatures. The
formula provided for various degrees of consent depending
upon subject matter. This included unanimous consent over
any change to the distribution of powers. A large number of
additions were made to the areas excluded from amendment by




Pearson, Mike, Vol. Ill, pp. 251-254
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this exclusion, among others, were guarantees for the use of
159
the French and English languages. In 1966, after a long
battle, it became apparent that Jean Lesage could not obtain
support for the proposal in the Opposition-controlled Legis-
lative Council, Quebec's upper house, and his support was
withdrawn. Consideration of the Fulton-Favreau formula was
j a 160suspended.
In 1968, as a lame duck, Prime Minister Pearson
made his last attempt to revise the Canadian constitution.
He called a full Federal-Provincial Constitutional Conference
for early February 1968. While the Conference made no deci-
sions and produced no proposals, it did maintain the momentum
for constitutional change and publicize, through its tele-
cast, the need for change to the country. The only concrete
result was the formation of a continuing Constitutional
n * 161Conference.
e. Pierre Elliott Trudeau
On 20 April 1968, following Prime Minister Lester
Pearson's resignation and a hotly contested battle for the
leadership of the Liberal Party, Pierre Elliott Trudeau be-
came the Prime Minister of Canada. In his first meeting with
159Canada, Government of Canada, The Canadian Constitu-
tion and Constitutional Amendment
, pp. 14-15.
Pearson, Mike , Vol. Ill, pp. 252-253.
Ibid., pp. 256-259. This continuing Conference ul-
timately produced the Victoria Charter of 1971.
63

Commons, on the afternoon of 23 April, he dissolved Parlia-
ment and announced an election for 25 June.
Trudeau was an extremely well-educated and phil-
osophical person. He was probably one of the few leaders in
the history of Canada who entered politics with a well thought-
out political philosophy. Trudeau 1 s philosophy, largely con-
structed from elements of Acton, de Tocqueville, Montesquieu,
Mill and Locke, was a complete system which began with the
role of the individual, worked its way through the function of
the state, and then addressed the specific problems. Four
primary themes dominated: the absolute value of the individual,
the supremacy of rationality, the struggle between totali-
tarian and democratic tendencies, and the obligation of indi-
163
viduals to involve themselves in the political process.
Trudeau ' s emphasis on the individual, freedom
and rationality has led him to loath nationalism in general
and political nationalism in particular. He has objected
that in the nation-state, the individual is no longer para-
mount. Rather than the state serving the individual, he saw
the individual reduced to an instrumentality in the pursuit
164






164Pierre E. Trudeau, Federalism and the French Canadians
(New YOrk: St. Martin's Press, 1968), p. 165; and Pierre
Trudeau, "Canada and French-Canadian Nationalism," in Canada:
A Guide to the Peaceable Kingdom , ed. William Kilbourn (New
York: St. Martin's Press, 1970), p. 15.
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Trudeau's entry into politics in 1965 was direct-
ly related to the Quiet Revolution in Quebec and the trans-
formation of French Canadian nationalism from a defensive
form to a confidently aggressive posture. Speaking in 1973
of his reasons for entering politics, Trudeau said, "...mine
were twofold. One was to make sure that Quebec wouldn't
leave Canada through separatism, the other was to make sure
that Canada wouldn't shove Quebec out through narrowmindedness .
"
Trudeau was convinced that there was no serious
fault in the federal system and that reasonable French and
English Canadians could use the structure successfully. "I
am inclined," he said in one of his works, "to believe that
the authors of the Canadian federation arrived at as wise a
compromise and drew up as sensible a constitution as any
16 6
group of men anywhere could have done ... I should be very
surprised if real statesmen, give the facts of the problem,
arrived at the conclusion that our constitution needs drastic
16 7
revision." This approach required, however, a rational and
goodwilled likemindedness on the part of all citizens to be
successful. Each Canadian was required to see the entire
country as theirs if the country were to survive. Trudeau
16 5
Pierre E. Trudeau, "CTV Interview *W5'," CTV Tran-
script, 21 December 1973.
166
Trudeau, Federalism and the French Canadians , p. 197






saw the evolving situation as proof of the failure of Cana-
dians to play by the rules. "It is wrong to say that con-
federation has been a total failure for French Canadians;
the truth is rather that they have never really tried to make
a success of it. In Quebec, we tended to fall back upon a
sterile, negative provincial autonomy; in Ottawa our frequent
1 f.Q
abstentions encouraged paternalistic centralization." As
for English Canada, "...the rules of the game were not al-
ways upheld. In the matter of education as well as political
rights, the safeguards so dear to French Canadians were
nearly always disregarded throughout the country, so that
they came to believe themselves secure only in Quebec. Worse
still, in those areas not specifically covered by the con-
stitution, the English-speaking majority used its size and
wealth to impose a set of social roles humiliating to French
Canadians. In the federal civil service, for example, and
even more so in the Canadian armed forces, a French-Canadian
started off with an enormous handicap - if indeed he managed
to start at all. This was also true in finance, business,
16 9
and at all levels of industry."
Trudeau consistently turned away from a special
status for Quebec, believing that it would cause it to turn
further in upon itself. Instead he pinned his hope on trying









right to, Canada as a whole. Trudeau's strategy was pin-
ned on two major undertakings, constitutional revision and
language policy.
f. Trudeau and Constitutional Reform
Trudeau's first experience as Prime Minister with
constitutional reform came in mid-June 1971 when the contin-
uing Constitutional Conference presented a proposal for the
Canadian Constitutional Charter. The Victoria Charter, as it
became known, provided a patriation procedure, an amending
formula acceptable to all governments, and changes in substan-
tive areas which modernized the constitution. The amending
formula was a major departure from any previous attempt. It
did not require the unanimous consent of the eleven legisla-
tive bodies in Canada for the amendment of any part of the
constitution, and amendments were to take the form of a
Proclamation of the Governor General rather than an Act o e
172
Parliament. The most important change, from Mr. Trudeau s
standpoint, was the inclusion of an enshrined charter of
human rights that would, among other rights, guarantee French-
Canadians throughout Canada the same language rights that
English-speaking Canadians had long enjoyed in Quebec.
Radwanski, pp. 314-315.
171Canada, Constitutional Conference, Constitutional Con -
ference Proceedings , Victoria, British Columbia, 14 June
1971, pp. 49-70.
Ibid.
Ibid.; and Radwanski, pp. 315-316.
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At Victoria it was agreed that the Charter
should be reported to all eleven governments for consider-
ation and that if its acceptance, as a whole, was communi-
cated to the Secretary of the Constitutional Conference by
28 June 1971, the governments would then recommend the Char-
ter to their respective legislatures. On 23 June, the
Government of Quebec informed the Secretary that it could
not recommend the Charter because the clauses dealing with
income security allowed too great a latitude for interpre-
174
tation. It is not clear however that that was the only
reason for the Quebec position. The costs of implementation
were seen as prohibitively expensive in some quarters, while
in others it was asserted that the Charter did not go far
enough in the direction of decentralization and special
status for Quebec
.
In 1975 Prime Minister Trudeau attempted to by-
pass the 1971 problems by proposing patriation of the BNA
Act on the basis of applying the Victoria Charter amending
procedures to Section 91(1) only. No other issues of sub-
stantive constitutional reform were to be addressed. This
basis was not satisfactory to several of the Premiers who
suggested additional conditions. On 31 March 1976 Mr.
174Canda, Government of Canada, The Canadian Constitu-
tion and Constitutional Amendment
, p. 12.
175Radwanski, p. 316; and Saywell, p. 55.
17 6
Canada, Government of Canada, The Canadian Constitu-
tion and Constitutional Amendment, p. 12.
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Trudeau addressed a proposal incorporating these concerns to
177
the Premiers. Their reply in October 197 6, presented by
Premier Lougheed of Alberta indicated that the political tide
had shifted again and that the Premiers could no longer unani-
mously endorse the Victoria amending procedure. Additionally,
the process of patriation without revision, especially of the




In January 1977 the Prime Minister asked the
Premiers to reconsider their position, but no new joint posi-
179
tion was undertaken. Thus, on 12 June 1973 the Govern-
ment of Canada published a White Paper entitled A Time for
Action in which it proposed to pursue constitutional renewal
in two phases. In the first phase the Government would,
after consultation with the provinces, ask Parliament to
amend certain sections of the 3NA Act which are within its
competence. In the second phase the Government and provinces
would establish a consensus on the remainder of areas not
18
amendable in Canada, especially the distribution of powers.
177 Canada, Prime Minister, Letters from the Prime Mini-
ster to the Premiers of the Provinces concerning "Patriation"
of the BNA Act with attachments, 31 March 197 6.
178 Canada, Premier of Alberta, Premier of Alberta's
letter to Prime Minister Trudeau, 14 October 197 6, in reply
to the letter of 31 March 1976.
179Canada, Prime Minister, Prime Minister's letter to
the Premier of Alberta, 19 January 1977, in reply to the
letter of 14 October 1976.
18
Canada, Government of Canada, A Time for Action:
Toward the Renewal of the Canadian Federation (Ottawa:
Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1978), pp. 17-26
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On 20 June 1978 the Government tabled, in the House of Com-
181
mons, the Constitutional Amendment Bill - 1973 .
The Constitutional Amendment Bill - 1973 involved
a comprehensive modification of the Canadian constitution.
The major changes proposed were in the Supreme Court, The
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the Senate, the
distribution of powers, and executive reorganization. Alter-
natives for amending and patriating the constitution were
listed and discussed, but the government delayed the deci-
18 2
sion on which to endorse.
Reform of the Supreme Court was undertaken for a
variety of reasons. First, the existence of the court, its
jurisdiction and the tenure of its judges depended upon
statutory law with no constitutional guarantees. Second, the
members of the court were appointed exclusively by the federal
government. Third, the size of the court and the geographic
distribution of its members had been questioned. Finally,
contention arose over whether the court should have jurisdic-
tion only on constitutional questions, or whether it should
18 3
continue to hear appeals on civil law, especially that of Quebec.
181
"Trudeau to Introduce Constitutional Reform Bill in
Parliament Today," Monterey Peninsula Herald , 2 June 197 8.
18 2Canada, Government of Canada, The Constitutional
Amendment Bill: Text and Explanatory Notes , 1978.
183Canada, Department of Justice, Constitutional Reform -
The Supreme Court of Canada, 15 August 1978, p~. 2~.
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The Constitutional Amendment Bill - 1973 proposed
to expand the number of justices from nine to eleven and
specify a geographic distribution for the justices. It also
required that the provinces be consulted in the nomination
of judges, and that all appointments be confirmed by the
House of Federation. Finally the bill maintained the broad
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court while it allowed only




civil law. The principal criticism or the proposal was
18 5
that it might unilaterally alter the provincial powers
.
The debate about the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms centered on whether the basic rights need to
be entrenched in the constitution and what the scope of the
18 6
rights and freedoms should be. The proposals of the Con-
stitutional Amendment Bill - 1973 constitutionally entrenched
basic protection at all levels of Canadian government. It
protected political and democratic rights and freedoms, indi-
vidual legal rights, the free movement of citizens, anti-
discrimination rights, rights respecting the English and
184 Canada, Government of Canada, The Constitutional
Amendment Bill: Text and Explanatory Notes
, pp. 49-55.
18 5Canada, Canadian Embassy, Washington, D.C., "Premiers'
Annual Conference," Canadian Press Comment , No. 32, 25
August 1978, p. 1.
18 6
Canada, Department of Justice, The Constitutional
Amendment Bill: Explanatory Notes on the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms




13 7French languages, and other subsidiary rights and freedoms.
The Charter was criticized primarily for its oversights:
double jeopardy was not prohibited, no provision was in-
cluded to guarantee the right to trial by jury, no provision
was made for the protection of privacy, no protection was
included against vaguely worded offenses and non-specific
accusations, and the provisions for redressing breaches of
18 8
rights were inadequate.
Several criticisms of the old Senate were aired
in past years and considered in the preparation of the Con -
stitutional Amendment Bill - 1973 . Some critics thought
that the upper house of the Canadian Parliament should func-
tion as an effective regional advocate independent of party
discipline. It was argued that that would relieve the pro-
vincial governments of any need to intrude into federal
areas of responsibility. Other critics said that the members
should be chosen to reflect the widest regional view pos-
sible, and that they ought to reflect the views of all region-
al parties. Finally, it was suggested that confidence be
maintained only in the directly elected house which would
13 9
allow the appointed house to exert pressure on the Government.
187 Canada, Government of Canada, The Constitutional
Amendment Bill: Text and Explanatory Notes
, pp. 4-13.
188
"Rights and freedoms charter haphazard, lawyer says,"
The Globe and Mail (Toronto), 21 September 1978.
189Canada, Ministry of State for Federal-Provincial




The proposals in the Constitutional Amendment
Bill - 1978 were to increase the total membership and align
it toward greater regional equality. Members of the House
of Federation were to be appointed, half by the federal
government and half by the provinces, from all political
parties on the basis of popular vote. The new House was to
be able to delay and initiate legislation except money bills,
and confirm appointments to the Supreme Court and some Crown
agencies. In order to safeguard language rights the bill
was to require a dual majority on any bill of "linguistic
190
significance." Major objections to the proposal were re-
gistered immediately on two grounds. First, the method of
appointing members was unwieldy. Second, the bill required
a major structural change in the federal structure which
could not be made without provincial consultation and
191
concurrence.
The issue of federal-provincial distribution of
powers was one of the abiding Canadian constitutional issues
for many years preceding the 1973 Bill. The principal ob-
jectives were to redefine and distribute the powers in such
a way that the provinces were pre-eminent and to increase
the transfer payments from the federal to provincial
190Canada, Government of Canada, The Constitutional
Amendment Bill; Text and Explanatory Notes
, pp. 20-32.
191Canadian Press Comment , No. 32, pp. 1-4; and "Pro-
vinces' stand a direct intrusion, Trudeau writes," The Globe
and Mail (Toronto), 19 September 1978.
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192governments. The Constitutional Amendment Bill - 1973
required that First Ministers meet annually, and that the
federal government consult with the provinces before appoint-
ing lieutenant-governors or invoking its declaratory power.
Additionally, it provided a means for constitutionally en-
. . . . 193
shrining certain federal payments to the provinces. There
was significant resistance to this section of the bill for
several reasons. First, the provinces wanted a clearer
division of power and a greater influence in areas that
affected them. Second, it was argued that the two-phase im-
plementation of the constitutional reofrm would hazard any
adjustment made in response to the demands of provincial
governments. Third, the provinces demanded a guarantee for
provincial ownership of natural resources. Finally, the
provinces felt that the Bill did not solve the problems
. . 194
associated with regional disparities.
The executive reorganization proposed by the
Constitutional Amendment Bill was designed to bring the con-
195
stitution into line with the actual practices of government.
The Governor General was to exercise prerogatives, functions,
and authority in his own right as the constitutionally
192Pearson, Mike , Vol. Ill, p. 254.
193 Canada, Government of Canada, The Constitutional
Amendment Bill: Text and Explanatory Notes
, pp. 41-47.
194Canadian Press Comment , No. 32, pp. 1-4.
195Canada, Government of Canada, The Constitutional
Amendment Bill: Text and Explanatory Notes, pp. 16-19.
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designated head of state; the Queen would remain sovereign
head of Canada and exercise full powers when in Canada. The
functions of the Prime Minister and cabinet were to become
constitutionally prescribed, and the Privy Council was to
have become a Council of State. The primary opposition
to executive reform was based on conservative reaction against
any change in the written status of the Queen's prerogatives
197
as the sovereign head of state. Additional opposition
was based on the premise that the appointment of the head of
state by the chief executive would place too much power in
the hands of the Prime Minister, who did not represent all
198
of the people of Canada. Anti-federalists, especially
the PQ opposed any diminution of the power of the Queen since
it implied a concurrent enhancement of the power of the
199federal government.
The Trudeau government received extensive criti-
cism for its decision to put off consideration of patriation
and amending procedures until Phase II of the constitutional
revision. These have, historically, been the most
Ibid.
197Robert Trumbull, "Queen's Visit Stirs a Debate in
Canada," The New York Times , 5 August 1978; Canadian Press
Comment
, No. 32, pp. 1-3; and "Struggling for Self -Mastery ,
"
Time
, 26 June 1978, p. 43.




Canada, Government of Canada, A Time for Action:
Toward the Renewal of the Canadian Federation (Ottawa:
Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1978), pp. 24-25.
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difficult issues to solve and the Government demonstrated
very little early leadership in finding solutions . It out-
lined four methods for amendment and over ten different
methods for the initiation of an amendment, but endorsed
201
none. The Government's critxcs were quick to point out
that a failure to resolve either or both of the questions of
patriation or amendment would radically alter the nature of




The Constitutional Amendment Bill - 1973 was
rejected out of hand by Quebec Premier Rene Levesque on the
day it was tabled, and the spectre of secessionist Quebec
203haunted the debate about the Bill. The federal Bill was
being considered at the same time that the PQ was preparing
its plans for a referendum on sovereignty-association and the
contrast exacerbated regional tensions and highlighted
regional inequalities during the debate on sections of the
204bill designed to reduce those disparities. The Trudeau
government attempted to exploit the PQ position to gain quick
acceptance of its program. Prominent Liberals argued that
201Canada, Government of Canada, The Canadian Constitu-
tion and Constitutional Amendment
,
pp- 18-24.
202Canadian Press Comment , No. 32, pp. 1,3.
203
"Trudeau to Introduce Constitutional Reform Bill in
Parliament Today."
204Canadian Press Comment , No. 32, p. 2; and Canada,
House of Commons, Debates , "Debate on National Unity, P.E.
Trudeau, J. Clark, and E. Broadbent," 5 July 1977.
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traumatic national crisis could be avoided through early
constitutional renewal while others simply noted that Quebec
participation in the constitutional conferences belied any
,.. .. „ . . . 205imminent or irreversible action toward secession.
In spite of the rebuff by Quebec the Government
proceeded with a first reading of the bill before abandoning
parliamentary debate until the following session. In the
interim provincial and public discussion were to be culti-
vated and a joint committee of the Commons and Senate was to
review the substance of the bill. Mr. Trudeau announced
that he had scheduled Phase I to complete no later than
1 July 1979, and Phase II no later than 1981.
Between August 9-12, the provincial premiers met
in Regina, Saskatchewan and unanimously rejected the Govern-
ment proposals embodied in the Constitutional Amendment Bill .
The major points of departure were the status of the mon-
archy, the revision of the Senate, the distribution of
powers, and the lack of an amending procedure. Mr. Trudeau '
s
avowed intention for the federal government to take uni-
lateral action to implement amendments within its competence
if the provinces resist or reject his program was singled out
207for particularly caustic criticism.
205Canadian Press Comment , No. 32, p. 3; and "Constitu-
tion change necessary if vote to be won, Lalonde says,"
The Globe and Mail (Toronto), 19 September 1978.
2 fi
Canada, Government of Canada, A Time for Action:
Toward the Renewal of the Canadian Federation
, pp. 24-26
207Canadian Press Comment, No. 32, pp. 1-4.
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The outcome of Mr. Trudeau ' s latest efforts for
constitutional reform remained unresolved at the end of 1978.
The Joint Committee of the Commons and Senate began hearings
on the Constitutional Amendment Bill - 1973 on 15 August
2 8
1978. The Prime Minister also started a counterattack
against the provincial premiers in September 1978. In a let-
ter addressed to the premiers collectively, he strongly pro-
tested their public intrusion into an area where they enjoyed
no legal competence. As a final aside he reminded them that
the federal government had already graciously scheduled an
opportunity for them to be heard, in spite of their status,
at the Federal-Provincial Constitutional Conference scheduled
209from 30 October - 1 November 1978. An early or favorable
resolution in that round of constitutional reform was unlike-
ly. Mistrust of the central government had permeated and
undermined federal-provincial relations for a long rime . Pro-
vincial procrastination and vacillation had prevented consti-
tutional reform in the past. Regional tensions had continued
unabated. Finally, the unified front of the provincial pre-
miers was a fragile alliance with no real chance of survival
if they decided to tackle a compromise
.
2 8Marc Lalonde, Statement by the Honourable Marc Lalonde
,
Minister of State for Federal-Provincial Relations, to the
Joint Parliamentary Committee on the Constitution, 15 August
1978, pp. 1-7.
209




Unlike constitutional reform, Prime Minister
Trudeau held almost all the levers necessary to implement
his language program. In spite of uneven areas, it was
clearly the most successful portion of his cultural program.
Within months of becoming Prime Minister he submitted The
Official Languages Act 1968-1969 to the Parliament. This
Act established English and French as the official languages
of Canada for all purposes of the Parliament and Government
of Canada. Both languages shared equality of status,
rights, and privilege in their use. The Act extended the
scope of official bilingualism into the grey areas surround-
ing Section 133 of the BNA Act to ensure that every citizen
would enjoy the right to deal in either official language with
the federal government, its agencies, and Crown corporations.
Through this vehicle Trudeau implemented a language program
designed to improve the ability of the federal public service
to serve the people of Canada in both official languages,
to increase the use of French as a language of work, and to
provide for equitable participation of both official language
211
communities in the public service.
210Canada, Parliament of Canada, Official Languages Act
1968-1969 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer for Canada, 1970),
c. 54, s. 2.
211Canada, Government of Canada, A National Understand -




For Trudeau, the official languages policy was
"intimately related to the continuing existence of Canada as
212
a single, united country." Thus, it was a confusing and
frustrating experience for him to encounter the misconcep-
tions about the program which existed in many portions of
Canada. Citizens often grumbled that Trudeau was trying to
213force French on people or make the whole country French.
Trudeau was clear and consistent in his attempts to dispel
the myths about bilingualism. The message was simple:
"Bilingualism is an imposition on the state and not the citi-
zens... we want the government of all Canadians, the central
214government, to be able to communicate with the population."
In spite of some confusion and resistance the
Official Languages program went forward. In September 1969
the Official Languages Act entered force and the Royal Com-
mission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism published its
report on language in the work world in which it found that
"...socially and economically, Francophones are in a far
215
weaker position than Anglophones in the work world." Less
than a year later Mr. Trudeau announced in Commons his Govern-
ment's acceptance of the recommendations made by the Royal
212
Ibid.
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Commission. Mr. Trudeau stated that French language units
(FLU) would be formed in the Dublic service and appointments
made of Francophones to the most senior positions. He
emphasized that the merit system would be maintained and
that many of the language initiatives recommended by the
Commission were already underway in the Public Service and
217Armed Forces. Less than three months later the first
FLU was formed.
The Official Languages policy was not implemented
without some inconvenience and cost, but by and large the
program was implemented humanely. The government went to
considerable and expensive lengths to avoid injustice to in-
cumbent employees and extensive, free language training was
made available to federal employees. The Department of the
Secretary of State was reinforced, and a new service added
to it to coordinate the implementation of the government's
218
official language policy." Ultimately about one-fifth
of all federal jobs were classified as bilingual. The total
cost of the bilingualism program was estimated to be about
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III. DEFENSE POLICY REVOLUTION 1963-1973
A. TRADITIONAL POLICY
1. Canada and NATO
Canadian foreign and defense policy has been inten-
tionally and inextricably interwoven with the fabric of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization since the latter was
founded in 1949. Over the years this relationship exper-
ienced significant variations in the nature, scope, and im-
portance of the Canadian participation in NATO.
Canada emerged from the Second World War with its
industrial plant, territory, and economy intact. Postwar
planning was underpinned by the assumption that, in the
future, Canada would never have to fight alone and could de-
pend upon collective action. Thus Canada embraced rhe United
Nations concept and renewed the North Atlantic Triangle in
1946. The bases for the Triangle were Canada's imperial
relationship with Great Britain and the Canadian-U . S . Ogdens-
burg Declaration of 13 August 1940. They were updated during
the visit of Field Marshal Montgomery to North America and
secret agreements were completed to cooperate in research,
220development, standardization, strategy, and tactics.
The nationalistic reaction of Canada to its rapidly




was largely responsible for the predisposition of the Cana-
221dians toward a formal peacetime alliance. Additionally,
the resurgence of Soviet power in Europe, coupled with the
inability of the United Nations to implement collective
security measures, caused a significant reversal of defense
policy after Prime Minister Mackenzie King's rapid postwar
demobilization. Preliminary steps toward the Atlantic
Alliance were taken within the framework of Article 51 of
the United Nations charter in March 1943 when Britain,
France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg signed the
222
Brussels Treaty on' mutual assistance.
Throughout 1947 and 1948 other Western countries
began to consider their own defense requirements and the
possibility of a broader collective arrangement, reflected
in Canada by a series of official speeches by statesmen
such as Mackenzie King, Louis St. Laurent, Lester Pearson,
221James George Eayrs , In Defence or Canada: Peacemaking
and Deterrence (Toronto: The University of Toronto Press,
1972), pp. 75-106, 319-344. Eayrs discusses the perceived
threat to Canadian sovereignty posed by joint ventures such
as the construction of weather, LORAN, and radar stations in
the arctic as well as joint exercises. McLin, pp. 9-13,
discusses these as well as the Principles of Collaboration
(12 February 1947): a) interchange of personnel, b) general
cooperation, c) standardization, d) mutual and reciprocal
availability of facilities, e) sovereign control; the Visit-
ing Forces Act of 1947; and the repurchase of facilities
from the United States by Canada.
222Canada, Department of External Affairs, Information
Services Division, Canada and NATO , Reference Paper 77,
(September 1977), pp. 1-2. Article 51 gives U.N. member
nations the rights of both individual and collective self-





and Escott Reid, anticipated and framed the international
discussion. On 28 April 1948, the idea of a single mutual
defense system superceding the Brussels Treaty was proposed
by Canadian Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent. Negotiations
on the North Atlantic Treaty began on 6 July 1948 in Wash-
ington, D.C. between the United States, Canada, and the
223Brussels pact nations. The question of whether the new
organization would be an agency of the United Nations was
particularly important.
On 19 June 1943 St. Laurent suggested a regional
pact with geographical limits and a functional character
almost identical to the final shape of the North Atlantic
224
Treaty Organization. The treaty was signed by the con-
ferees on 4 April 1949 and they were shortly joined by Den-
mark, Iceland, Italy, Norway, and Portugal. Greece and
Turkey joined the Alliance in 19 52, and the Federal Republic
225
of Germany in 195 5.
Canadian diplomats made significant contributions to
the negotiation and ultimate shape of NATO in three areas
:
degree of commitment, status of individual states, and the
non-military aspect of the alliance. Canadians sought to
guard the right of Parliament to declare war against the
223_..,
Ibid.
, p . 2
.
224 MMcLm, p. 13.
225NATO Information Service, NATO Handbook (Brussels




European desire for automatic response to aggression.
Article V satisfactorily compromised between the two posi-
tions by requiring a member to take "forthwith, individually
and in concert with the other parties, such action as it
227deems necessary including the use of armed force." It
was a fundamental principle of Canada's policy toward inter-
national organization since the interwar period to ensure that
member states other than the Great Powers should not be indis-
criminately treated together, without differentiation of their
228important characteristics and abilities."" This was reflected
in the "functional idea" in Canadian thought, an outgrowth of
the functional theorv in political science. As reflected in
NATO it was represented by the constitutional granting of
229powers to all organs of the organizations by member nations.
Canadian diplomats were extremely persistent during
negotiation of the North Atlantic Treaty to include provi-
sions for non-military cooperation. This was motivated by
an understanding that their domestic constituents, especially
in Quebec, would not accept a long-term security commitment
on military grounds alone as well as a distaste for military
solutions to international problems, appreciation that
22 6
McLin, p. 14; and Pearson, Mike , Vol. II, pp. 47-55.
227NATO Information Service, p. 10; and Pearson, Mike ,
Vol. II, pp. 47-55.
22 8
Eayrs, pp. 161-163.
229McLin, pp. 14-15; and Pearson, Mike, Vol. II, pp. 47-55
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economic weakness could be a threat as significant to Alli-
ance security as military unpreparedness , and the opportunity
to realize a traditional and high priority goal of Canadian
diplomacy - the forging of strong U.S. -Western European coop-
230
eration. In spite of opposition from the United Kingdom and
indifference from the United States, Canada prevailed and Arti-
cle II, which became known as the "Canadian article," was
231incorporated. These initiatives set the tenor of early
Canadian Alliance politics by demonstrating an instance
in which Canada had been significantly involved in the devel-
opment of high policy and by suggesting that this might be
feasible on a continuing basis.
Canada always interpreted Article III of the North
Atlantic Treaty to mean that the phrase which enjoined mem-
bers to "develop their individual and collective capacity to
resist armed attack" obligated the pooling of military re-
sources between members. However, this was not initially
held to require the stationing of Canadian forces in Europe.
Instead Canada developed a program of mutual aid which sent
Canadian equipment and material to Europe and provided a
232
market for the expansion of Canadian defense industry.
30 Ibid., pp. 18-19; and Pearson, Mike, Vol. II, pp. 55-53
231NATO Information Service, pp. 9,13; and Pearson, Mike,
Vol. II, pp. 56-58.
232
McLin, p. 18; and Pearson, Mike , Vol. II, pp. 80-81.
The SIPRI Arms Trade Registers for instance reflect the sale
of over 160 Sabre aircraft built by Canadair under U.S.
license to Greece and Turkey. Such sales were responsible
for allowing economical production runs.
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This policy was changed after the outbreak of the Korean War
at the request of General Eisenhower, then SACEUR. In a
Speech from the Throne on 30 January 1951 the government
announced plans to send one infantry brigade of 5,000 men
for the central front in Germany and eleven squadrons of
interceptor aircraft to France for air defense. Additional-
ly, two brigades were kept on reserve in Canada and thirty
Canadian ships were earmarked for the NATO Atlantic Command.
These forces were committed on the understanding that they
would be brought home as Europe recovered its military
233
strength. Canadian military participation in NATO during
the early fifties provided significant forces for the aug-
mentation of all sectors of the thin defenses of a Europe
just commencing rearmament.
Canadian diplomats were active, in the tradition of
their fight for Article Two, in the non-military affairs of
the Alliance during this early period. In 19 51 Lester Pear-
son chaired a five-nation committee which investigated and
reported upon the concept of the "Atlantic Community." The
committee was unable to achieve a consensus on specific
methods for increasing collaboration under Article II and
achieved no concrete results. Again in 1956, in the wake of
internal frictions, the growing Soviet economic threat, and
receding Soviet military threats Mr. Pearson chaired a com-





of Norway, and Gaetano Martino of Italy to consider non-military
234
cooperation and unity. The report of the committee, issued
on 15 December 1956 after the Suez crisis, gave critical impe-
tus to the development of political consultation by calling
for consultation on all matters of interest to the Alliance
2 3 5during the formative stages of government decision making.
Canada also played an important part in the dialog
which clarified the strategic debate about "massive retalia-
tion" and in the discussions which surrounded the German
rearmament and accession to the Alliance. Canadian diplomats
led by Mr. Pearson forcefully challenged the concept of
"massive retaliation" announced by Secretary Dulles on 12
January 1954 along three main lines: first was the possi-
bility of an excessively automatic response to aggression,
second was the possible use of inappropriately excessive
means of retaliation for minor conflicts, and last was the
possibility of retaliation without consultation of allies.
This dialog resulted in the satisfactory clarification of
the strategic doctrine and, on a continuing basis, contri-
2 3 6buted to the evolution of the doctrine of flexible response.
234NATO Information Service, pp. 20,28; and Pearson,
Mike
, Vol. II, pp. 92-94.
235NATO Information Service, pp. 2 0,2 8; and Pearson,
Mike
, Vol. II, pp. 95-97.
236
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On the question of German rearmament, Canada was not
initially enthusiastic. However, a European Defence Commun-
ity (EDO , German membership in NATO, or a series of bilateral
pacts were all options mentioned by the Canadian government
as acceptable in this regard. After the failure of the EDC
,
Canada strongly advanced the idea of German accession to
NATO. Canada participated in the London Conference where
the German solution was worked out. Again Canada sought to
maintain the unity of NATO and helped avoid a split between
237Western Europe and North America.
The second major period in the Canadian relationship
with NATO extended from 19 57 to 196 3 during the government
of Prime Minister John G. Diefenbaker. During this period
the growth of Soviet missile forces gradually undermined the
importance of the Canadian air defense role in NATO and the
accelerated rearmament of Western Europe relegated the Cana-
dian Army contingent on the continent to a less important
role. The major issues concerning Canada and NATO during
this period were the withdrawal of Canadian forces from
Europe, the re-equipment of the Canadian forces assigned tc
NATO, and the transformation of the Canadian NATO contingent
to perform specialized roles, especially those involving
nuclear weapons. Canada assumed a "chipping in" posture
with respect to NATO in this period and NATO affairs often
237 Ibid., p. 26; and Pearson, Mike , Vol. II, pp. 85-91.
Pearson especially wanted to prevent a separate U.S. -German
defense relationship outside the NATO context after the
collapse of the EDC.
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ran second in public attention to the separate, albeit re-
lated, issues revolving around the formation of NORAD and
the problems associated with Joint Defense Production and
Sharing with the United States.
Canadian armed forces were sent to Europe for NATO
with the clear understanding that they would be brought home
and placed in strategic reserve at the earliest possible
moment. Several circumstances combined in the late 1950 's
to increase pressure on Canada to pursue such recovery.
First, Canada was operating with a chronic balance of pay-
ments deficit which was exacerbated by maintaining military
forces in Europe. Second, high operating costs were incur-
red in the maintenance of the forces due to two phenomena:
Canadian forces were well paid volunteers (as opposed to
European conscripts) and they served at the terminus of a
3,000-mile logistics train. This resulted in an inefficient
allocation of defense monies in the Alliance and a discussion
of Alliance policies. The decision was made on political
criteria to leave the Canadian contingent in place. The
governing factor was the perception that a Canadian with-
drawal might be regarded as a precursor of American action.
A lesser consideration was the positive impact attributed tc
the Canadian forces upon the participation of the smaller
2 3 8European countries in NATO.
238 Ibid., pp. 106-107.
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During this period the Canadian brigade group in
Europe occupied a front line position on the central front
in Germany as a part of the British Army on the Rhine (BAOR)
although they were not an occupying power like all other
forces performing similar duties. Additionally, since the
group was independent and isolated, all support and facil-
ities normally provided to a brigade from the division,
corps, or army level had to be provided to the group organ-
ically, and from Canada. This included a medium artillery
regiment, an armored regiment, and bridging. In 1960 over-
tures were made at the military level to withdraw the brigade
group to a mobile reserve position and replace it with a
West German force. This overture succumbed to the same
political factors which operated in the previous decision to
239
retain Canadian forces in Europe. Subsequently, the cap-
ability of the group was improved in early 1962 by the pur-
chase of the nuclear capable Honest John tactical missile
system. The acquisition of Honest John was followed by
obfuscation on the part of the Diefenbaker government, starr-
ing as early as 1958, that it had not conducted negotiations
except in a most tentative fashion to obtain nuclear warheads
for the weapon system. This pattern of events reoccurred






government and was the root of a significant confrontation
240in Canadian-NATO relations.
During the late 1950' s increased emphasis on the
territorial nature of air defense within NATO made the Cana-
dian air division's position increasingly awkward and pre-
cipitated a search for an alternative role. Withdrawal, air
transport, and multimission roles were rejected for politi-
cal, prestige, and economic reasons respectively. The role
settled upon was strike-reconnaissance. It was first recom-
mended in 1956, discussed by General Norstad and Defence
Minister Pearkes in November 19 57, and agreed upon in July
2411959. The CF-104 aircraft required for this role first
became operational in 1962. They were not armed with nuclear
weapons until 1964. The reaction to the decision to shift
roles was milder than anticipated, especially since it en-
tailed a shift to an offensive, nuclear-armed attack role,
in an American-designed aircraft, for the Canadian forces.
The shock was mitigated considerably by not mentioning that
the role required nuclear weapons and by announcing that the
Lockheed CF-104 Starfighter would be produced under license
242in Canada. When the nature of the CF-104 strike-recon-
naissance role was better understood its nuclear role and
240
Ibid., pp. 112-114; and Pearson, Mike , Vol. Ill, po
.
69-75.
241Colin S. Gray, "The True North Strong and Free,
Canadian Defence Policy in the late 1970' s," Round Table
,





lack of suitable weapons became a distinct embarrassment
to the Diefenbaker government and contributed to its loss
of confidence.
During the Diefenbaker years the Navy escaped signi-
ficant scrutiny and retrenched in its specialized ASW role
243
within NATO. Its ability to avoid scrutiny was primarily
based upon its minority share of the defense budget, the re-
mote location of its forces, and poor comprehension of the
naval missions and strategy by potential parliamentary critics
For want of a complete evaluation and reappraisal of maritime
strategy the Royal Canadian Navy continued to operate, with-
out interference, on its small scale, in its traditional
o 4 4
ASW role, to keep maritime lanes of communication open."
Perhaps the most disruptive issue faced by Canada in
its NATO relations during this period was that of nuclear
weapons for Canadian forces. Several questions were central
245
to the debate:
"(1) Should Canadian forces have nuclear weapons under
their exclusive control, whether acquired by manufacture
or international agreement?
243Gray, "The True North Strong and Free, Canadian
Defence Policy in the 1970' s," p. 313.
244McLm, p. 121.
245
Ibid., p. 213; and Pearson, Mike , Vol. Ill, pp. 69-75
McLin devotes 44 pages to a detailed discussion of the
nuclear weapons controversy. Only an outline of the debate
is provided here. Pearson's few pages are concise, inform-
ative, and provide the Opposition viewpoint
93

(2) In what ways and to what extent should Canada con-
tribute to the U.S. nuclear deterrent by taking measures
under its control, such as allowing the storage of
American weapons and/or carriers on Canadian territory?
(3) Should Canadian forces in North American and/or
Europe be provided nuclear weapons which are not under
their exclusive control?"
The debate also involved questions of national obligations
to NATO, the effects on disarmament negotiations, secret
negotiations by the government without adequate consultation,
and misrepresentation by the government of its defense poli-
cies. Three weapon systems were primarily involved in Canada:
BOMARC surface-to-air missile, Honest John tactical missile,
and CF-104 Starfighter strike-reconnaissance fighter. Al-
though these systems entered service in March 1962, "early
1962", and October 1962 respectively, negotiations with the
United States for the procurement of warheads for them were
not completed until August 196 3. Delivery did not begin
until 1964. 246
A domestic debate about nuclear weapons was evaded
until a denouement was precipitated by the Cuban Missile
Crisis of October 1962. In February 1963, as a direct con-
sequence of the nuclear weapons debate and its incompetence
in handling it, the Diefenbaker government was toppled and
replaced by a Liberal government, led by Lester Pearson.
Pearson had reversed his earlier stand against nuclear
246
Ibid., p. 133; and Pearson, Mike , Vol. Ill, pp. 69-75.
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weapons and felt that Canada should honor its nuclear com-
247
mitments. In May the Pearson government moved quickly to
resolve the issue of nuclear forces for Canada. By August
1963 the negotiations were complete to obtain nuclear war-
248heads for the Canadian forces from the United States.
The third period in Canada's NATO relationship began
with the issuance of the defense White Paper of 1964 and
spans the remainder of the Pearson government until 1968.
During this period Canada recognized that she could not main-
tain her past influence in NATO affairs by moral force or
the weight of her military contribution. Canada attempted
to regain that influence through the development of a unique
military contribution required by the Alliance.
The White Paper of 1964, prepared by Defence Minister
Paul Hellyer, outlined a concept for Canada to contribute
well-equipped flexible conventional forces with a high degree
249
of strategic mobility to the Alliance. The most dramatic
change announced, justified on the grounds of improved coop-
eration and economy, was the integration of the Canadian
armed services as a first step toward unification. Implied
247
Ibid., p. 163; and Pearson, Mike, Vol. Ill, pp. 69-75.
Pearson was still convinced that Canada should find a new
non-nuclear role, but only after it had fulfilled its extant
obligations
.
248Paul Martin, "A Milestone in Atlantic Partnership,"
Statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs in
the House of Commons, May 27, 196 3, in Canadian Foreign Policy
1955-1965
, ed. Arthur E. Blanchette (Toronto: McClelland




by the White Paper was a sharp turn away from "balanced
collective forces" in which Canadian forces were specialized
within the NATO force structure, to the development of balanced,
250
autonomous Canadian contingents. The economy thrust was
designed to increase funds available for equipment purchases
by consolidating and eliminating redundant personnel billets.
This program was to support the Canadian defense industry by
the stabilizing effect of a long-term planning program inclu-
ded in the White Paper, preferences for Canadian industry,
and the new array of missions, for which Canadian industry
was able to compete satisfactorily for weapons contracts."
At the declaratory level the White Paper seemed tc
signify a reduced willingness to shape Canadian forces
according to the strategic requirements of its alliances and
a shift toward the United Nations as the preferred collect-
ive action agency for Canada. Canadian forces were to be
252prepared for minor conflicts rather than major ones. In
practice, procurement reflected this orientation, especially
the production of CF-5 Freedom fighters and the decision tc
refit the aircraft carrier Bonaventure . " However, no






253Gray, p. 314. Bonaventure was subsequently scrapped
and the majority of the CF-5's were sold or placed in storage.
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Canadian forces although the force structure was changed
somewhat. Canada was still heavily engaged in, and commit-
ted to by her capital inventory, strategic missions in the
„»m« 2 54NATO scenarios.
2. Canada and NORAD
Defense cooperation between Canada and the United
States for continental defense started with secret meetings
between the respective Chiefs of Staff in Washington in
January 19 38. The entry of Canada into the Second World War
accelerated talks on military assistance to Canada in the
summer of 1940 and provisions were made for permanent and
continuous consultations at the highest levels.
On 18 August 1940 the Ogdensburg Declaration announced
the formation of the Permanent Joint 3oard en Defense (PJBD)
.
This body had two working groups staffed from the defense and
external relations ministries of the two countries. It func-
tioned as an advisory group for the Heads of State and made
recommendations to them on joint military problems. It was
also responsible for joint studies and development of joint
a e i 256defense plans.
The Ogdensburg Declaration was complemented by the
Treaty for the Advancement of Peace signed on 6 September
Ibid.
255
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1940. This treaty went a long way toward easing Canadian
concerns about threats to their sovereignty by establishing
an International Commission to negotiate and resolve bilat-
eral disputes. Additionally, many open questions on terri-
257tonal waters and boundaries were resolved.
The Hyde Park Statement of 20 April 1941 supplemented
defense planning cooperation and established procedures for
joint procurement and payment for war supplies and materials.
It was supplemented by the Exchange of Defense Articles
Agreement under which each country supplied the material
2 5 8
it could produce most efficiently.
Two major infrastructure development projects were
jointly undertaken. These were the CANOL pipeline from
Norman Wells, NWT to Whitehorse, YT with its associated
refinery at Whitehorse for the U.S. Army, and the ALCAN
highway and airstrips. Canadians were well aware of the
disparities in population, wealth, and power between them-
selves and the United States, and jealously guarded their
sovereignty in all of these dealings. The CANCL Agreement
contained explicit buyback provisions, and on 27 July 1944
they concluded a far-reaching Agreement for the Payment of
257_, . ,Ibid.
25 8Charles T. Bevans , Treaties and Other International
Agreements of the United States of America 1776-1949
,
6 Vols. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1971),
Vol. 6, pp. 185-193.
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Certain Defense Installations, reaffirming that American
259
military operations were not desired in Canada in peacetime.
Although the PJBD became a permanent agency on 12 Feb-
ruary 194 7, the postwar development of the American and Can-
adian defense establishments was conducted with a much lower
degree of cooperation until about 1949. By early 1949 it had
become apparent that emerging air power made all nations vul-
nerable to modern weapons in spite of distance and space.
Additionally the ascending strategic importance of Canada's
geographic position between the U.S. and USSR became increasing-
ly apparent. On 21 April 1949, shortly after the signing of
the North Atlantic Treaty, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed
the American Continental Air Command (ConAC) to initiate
") 6joint planning with Canada for continental air defense.
In Canada two realizations set in at about the same
time. First, it became obvious that Canada could not phy-
sically and economically make the outlays necessary for her
defense and that the U.S. initiative promised an economical
way to achieve security. At the same time, Canadians real-
ized that only the most stringent controls on the operation
of facilities, visits, and overflights could avoid
259 Ibid., pp. 276-279.
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sattelitization in a joint venture with the Americans.
The original ConAC proposal for 25 radar sites, made on
5 January 1950, was stalled in the PJBD, returned for liason,
stalled at the PJBD again, and finally accepted. An ex-
change of notes on the subject of 1 August 1951 became
known as the Pinetree Agreement. The Pinetree Agreement
shared costs in a two-thirds U.S., one-third Canada ratio.
Canadian men and materials were used in construction. Can-
ada retained title to all sites in its territory, and
arrangements were made for Canadians to assume manning at
2 6 2
the ten sites originally staffed by the U.S.A.F.
The Pinetree installation was completed in late 1955
but by that time the U.S. had decided that it required augmen-
tation. In 1953 the U.S. -Canada Military Study Group (USCMSG)
recommended additional measures to defend against low-flying
targets by the addition of sites and the construction of two
new detection lines to the north of the Pinetree Line. Cn 30
June 19 54 Canada agreed to build the Mid-Canada Line (MCL) along
the 55th parallel from British Columbia to Labrador. On 5
May 1955 an exchange of notes authorized the construction of
the 58-station Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line along the
261
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North American Defense," Unpublished Air War College research
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69th parallel. This was rapidly followed by the Pinetree
Augmentation Agreement on 15 June 1955.
In 1954, as these bilateral agreements were begin-
ning to take form, the U.S. began to sort out the disarray
in which postwar interservice rivalry had left is air de-
fense system. Until that time voluntary and uneasy assoc-
iation had been the basis for the relationship between the
Army Anti-aircraft Command and the Air Force Air Defense
Command (which replaced ConAC which had been formed from the
old ADC and TAC ! ) . In September a new unified command, the
Continental Air Defense Command, was formed under General
264Benjamin Chidlaw at Colorado Springs.
The combination of these two developments led to a
recommendation by the USCMSG for the establishment of a
joint Canadian-American headquarters for continental air
defense on 11 May 19 57. The Canadian and U.S. governments
went foward with the proposal and on 12 September 19 57 the
North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) became operation-
al under a tentative agreement. On 12 May 19 5 8 the partner-
ship was formalized by an exchange of notes with an initial
ten-year term. The agreement limited NORAD to the exercise
of operational control in the context of joint consultation
between the governments under the aegis of NATO. CINCNORAD
26 3 Canada, Department of National Defence, A Summary of
Air Defence Agreements (Ottawa: Canadian Forces Headquar-




and his Deputy were required to be approved by the govern-
ments of both countries, and they reported to the U.S. Joint
2 6 5
Chiefs of Staff and the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee.
The history of MORAD was not tranquil. Its implemen-
tation was delayed by intervening Canadian parliamentary elec-
tions and a change of government in 19 57. More importantly,
its continued operation was challenged by a major debate in
the Canadian parliament. The main lines of the debate concerned
the propriety of the procedure by which the government had de-
cided to enter the joint command, the procedure followed in
implementing the decision, and the provisions for civilian con-
2 6 6
trol of the military and U.S. control of Canadian forces.
NORAD survived the early challenge but subsequently
became embroiled in further disputes over Canadian defense
policy. These primarily involved procurement decisions
associated with the CF-105 Arrow, CF-101B Voodoo, and CF-104
Starfighter aircraft, nuclear weapons, and the BOMARC
i fc 267missile system.
There were two major air defense additions to NORAD
in the 1960 's. First was the CADIN Agreement of 27 September
2 6 5
Ibid., pp. 39-59; and Canada, House of Commons,
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1961. This agreement provided upgraded defensive capabilities
by providing for BOMARC nuclear armed missile deployment in
Canada, the addition of over 52 new radar sites (45 of these
were gapfiller sites which were cancelled in 1963) , and the
addition of the SAGE system for the Pinetree Line. On 12
June 1961 Canada and the U.S. completed the Triangular Agree-
ment which dealt with Pinetree Line manning and funding, the
procurement of CF-104 fighters for NATO, and the U.S. grant
of CF-101B fighters for NORAD use.
Throughout the sixties there was a decline in the threat
from Soviet strategic bombers and a growing threat from her
ICBM's. In 1967 the U.S. decided to build a national ABM sys-
tem outside of NORAD. This relegated NORAD by 1968 primarily
to the roles of strategic warning and space surveillance as
anti-bomber defense became de-emphasized. The space surveil-
lance role was implemented by the addition of the Space Defense
269Center at NORADHQ and a Baker-Nunn camera at Cold Lake, Alberta.
The strategic warning role was enhanced by the U.S. construction
270
of the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) for NORAD.
3. Defense and Foreiqn Policv
—
There is a strongly held conventional wisdom among
analysts of Canadian defense policy that "in the contemporary
2 C Q
Canada, Department of National Defence, A Summary of
Air Defence Agreements
, pp. 2-1 - 6-1.
269Canada, House of Commons, SCEAND, Minutes of Pro-
s and
Ibid.




Canadian case the major purpose of defense policy has been
271
to support foreign policy." This statement has also been
further generalized and restated thus: "a Canadian defense
establishment. . .must therefore be aimed at objectives other
272
than national security." The range of objectives sug-
gested for Canadian defense policy has been fairly small.
Jon McLin suggested that the objectives of Canadian
defense policy were the promotion of the economic interests
of the Canadian defense industry and the support of Canadian
273diplomacy. McLin argued that purely military explanations
such as security from attack and enhancement of NATO's mili-
tary capability failed to credibly explain why Canada pursued
the policies it did. He also enumerated the objectives of
Canadian diplomacy which he considered to be supported by
defense policies. They were reinforcing the solidarity of the
274
NATO alliance and attaining influence within the alliance.
There have been refinements to McLin' s enumeration,
but basically no new additions. John Gellner, for instance,
asserted that the economic benefits which were the object of
defense policy were generally restricted to areas of high
271
R.B. Byers, "Defense and foreign policy in the 1970 's
the demise of the Trudeau doctrine," International Journal ,










technology, research and development, and defense production
275
which could be exported. Colin Gray extended the concept
a bit further when he argued that military professionals were
really the ones who benefitted economically, in the sense that
2 7fi
they were able to make any military requirement sound feasible.
Many objectives for attempting to gain diplomatic
influence have been suggested. Cuthbertson suggested that
influence gained by participation in NORAD allowed Canada to
preserve its national confidence and that NATO helped Canada
277
to seek overseas balances to the U.S. Gray argued that
it provided access to the policymaking councils which
2 7 8
would affect Canada were she represented or not. Douglas
saw influence as an "insurance against the less of autonomy"
279throughout Canada's history.
Canada's traditional posture was internationalist
in nature in 1968. Every government for the previous three
decades had acknowledged that defense policy was required to
275
J. Gellner, "The Place of Defence In The Economic
Life of Canada," in The Canadian Military , ed. H. Massey




Colin S. Gray, "The True North Strong and Free,
Canadian Defence Policy in the li70's," Round Table
,
No. 247, (1972) : 315.
277Cuthbertson, pp. 258-275.
2 7 8Gray, "The True North Strong and Free, Canadian
Defence Policy in the 1970 's," p. 321.
279W.A.B. Douglas, "Why does Canada have armed forces?"




support foreign policy. In this outlook, the military con-
tribution to NATO did not drive foreign policy formulation,
rather it allowed Canada to pursue foreign policy objectives
in spheres unrelated to collective security. In the few
instances when foreign policy and defense policy conflicted,
such as the nuclear weapons debate, foreign policy triumphed.
B. THE RISE AND FALL OF THE TRUDEAU DOCTRINE
Immediately after the federal elections of 25 June 1968
the new Liberal government of Pierre Trudeau undertook a
major reassessment of Canadian foreign policy. The first
indication of the outcome of the review appeared in a speech
by the Prime Minister on 3 April 1969 in which he announced
2 81
new priorities for national defense. Nine days later, in
Calgary, he told a surprised audience of Liberal supporters
that the past relationship between defense and foreign policy
had become intolerable and that "we have decided to review
our foreign policy and to have defence policy flow from that,
and from the defence policy to decide which alliances we
2 8 2
want to belong to, and how our defences should be deployed."
Trudeau ' s foreign policy review was an ambitious attempt
to spell out a coherent declaratory policy. The result was
280
R.B. Byers, "Defense and foreign policy in the 1970' s:
the demise of the Trudeau doctrine," p. 316.
281Canada, Department of External Affairs, Statements
and Speeches , No. 69/7.
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Foreign Policy for Canadians , a five-volume work which announ-
ced a shift away from Pearsonian internationalism toward a
2 8 3
policy closely linked to domestic priorities. Foreign
Policy for Canadians was complemented by Defence in the 70s
,
a White Paper on Defence published in August 1971. The White
Paper reiterated the reordered defense priorities which Trudeau
had announced in 1969 and placed them within the framework
284
of Foreign Policy for Canadians . The radical initiative
of these two works was consummated by a 1972 paper entitled
"Canada-U.S. Relations: Options for the future." With the
three policy statements in place the government appeared satis-
fied that a high degree of congruence existed between its
stated objectives and the objective conditions of the 1970 's.
The Trudeau Doctrine, as these three documents are often
collectively referred to, passed through three phases be-
2 8 5
tween 1968 and 1973. The first phase included the defense
and foreign policy reviews and the initial steps of reorien-
tation prior to the Options paper. The second phase
2 8 3Canada, Department of External Affairs, Foreign Policy
for Canadians , 5 vols. (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1970),
Vol. 1, pp. 8-9.
284 Canada, Department of National Defence, Defence m the
70s: White Paper on Defence (Ottawa: Information Canada,
1971)
, p. 3.
28 5Peyton V. Lyon, "The Trudeau Doctrine," International
Journal
, Vol. XXVI, (Winter 1970-1971): 19-20; and Byers
,
"Defense and foreign policy in the 1970 ' s: the demise of
the Trudeau doctrine," pp. 3 36-33 8.
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included the three years from early 1973 to late 1975 when
defense priorities were shifted to accommodate the Third
Option and the search for a contractual link with the E.E.C.
The final phase began in 1976 as domestic problems and a
changing international situation forced the Government to
move progressively closer to the U.S. and to rapidly divest
p o c
itself of the last vestiges of its earlier policies.
By the beginning of 1978 the "Third Option" had been
jettisoned, Canada ' s traditional foreign policy was resumed
and the Canadian Armed Forces had returned to the operating
principles and priorities established by the 1964 White
Paper. The Trudeau Doctrine was dead. The experience of
the 1970' s indicated the futility of declaratory policy in
a world of constant changes and the folly of using defense
and foreign policy as extensions of domestic policy.
Or did it? Critics of the Trudeau Doctrine had certainly
dismissed it and begun looking for a successor in late 1976
2 87
and early 1977. However, in early 19 79 superceding
policies had not appeared nor had the old Trudeau Doctrine
been explicitly repudiated by the Government. Did Trudeau, the
combatative , confrontationalist , egotist uncharacteristically
2 8 6
Byers, "Defense and foreign policy in the 1970s: the
demise of the Trudeau doctrine," pp. 336-338.
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R.B. Byers, "Defense for the Next Decade: The Forth-
coming White Paper," Canadian Defence Quarterly , Vol. 7,
no. 2, (Autumn 1977) : 18-22; and L. Rossetto, "A Final Look
at the 1971 White Paper on Defence," Queen's Quarterly
,
Vol. LXXXIV, (Spring 1977): 61-74.
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slink away? Why not? What were the specific objectives of
the Trudeau doctrine? Were any of them achieved? How?
Why, or why not? These questions were not addressed by
Trudeau 's critics. At the very least, the political slate
had been left in an uncharacteristically sloppy state in
1978 if the critics' diagnosis was accepted.
C. THE TRUDEAU DOCTRINE REVISITED
Pierre Trudeau' s decision to enter politics in 1965 was
made in direct response to the development of politicized bi-
2 38
cultural nationalism in Canada . ^ Trudeau' s entire steward-
ship focused upon the problems of national unity. He rejected
the idea that federal institutions were outmoded and insisted
that the national problems stemmed from a failure to utilize
289
the existing institutions. Every one of Trudeau 's policies
was designed ultimately to foster in all Canadians, but espe-
cially in French Canadians, a sense of equality in, and
290proprietary right to, Canada as a whole. In order to estab-
lish this pride in Canadian identification it also was neces-
sary for Trudeau 's policies to help establish the uniqueness
and self-evident value of the Canadian identity. In order to
adequately assess the success or failure of the Trudeau Doc-
trine, it must be analyzed in terms of Trudeau 's national unity
reference and his desire to de-politicize bicultural nationalism.
2 88
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The basic document containing the Trudeau Doctrine was
Foreign Policy for Canadians . The concern for national
unity permeated the work. The reasons listed for reviewing
foreign policy included "the reverberations of the quiet
291
revolution in Quebec," questioning the "need for contin-
292
uing Canadian participation in NATO," and "the renaissance
of French-Canada with its direct consequences for relations
293
with French-speaking countries." The relationship between
foreign and domestic policy which characterized the Trudeau
Doctrine is very clear in this passage: "external activities
should be directly related to national policies pursued within
Canada, and serve the same objectives ... in essence, foreign
policy is the product of the Government's progressive defini-
tion and pursuit of national aims and interests in the inter-
294
national environment. It is the extension of national policies."
The Basic National Aims of Canada were described in terms
that left no doubt of their applicability to Trudeau 's
cultural and language policies: The Basic National Aims
291Canada, Department of External Affairs, Foreign Policy
for Canadians , Vol. 1, p. 7.
292 Ibid., p. 8. The question of a long-term NATO com-
mitment with only a military content is one which is divisive
along national lines. The fear of the reaction by the Quebec
population to just such a situation was what originally
prompted the Canadians to suggest Art. 2 of the NATO Treaty.
Ibid.
294 T ,. ,Ibid.
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"encompass the main preoccupations of Canada and Canadians
today: national sovereignty, unity and security; federalism,
personal freedom and parliamentary democracy; national iden-
295
tity, bilmgualism, and multicultural expression." Foreign
Folicy for Canadians named six main themes through which the
Basic National Aims were pusued. Two of the themes, safe-
guarding sovereignty and independence, and enhancing the
quality of life, specifically engage elements of Trudeau's
cultural and language policies.
The necessity to prioritize and make choices between
policy themes was recognized and discussed in Foreign Policy
for Canadians . The Government stated that it "must assess
its various policy needs in the context of two inescapable
realities, both crucial to Canada's continuing existence:
- Internally, there is the multi-faceted problem of
maintaining national unity...
- Externally, there is the complex problem of living
distinct from but in harmony with the world's most




In forecasting prospects for the seventies, and describ-
ing emerging policy, the following statements were made in
Foreign Policy for Canadians :
"...the Government favours and is pursuing. . .policies at
home and abroad which convince all Canadians that the












"...the survival of Canada as a nation is being chal-
lenged internally by divisive forces. This underlines
further the need for new emphasis on policies, domestic
and external, that promote economic growth, social
justice, and an enhanced quality of life for all
Canadians." 299
"The decision on Canada's future military contribution
to NATO. . .was based on the Government's belief that...
there would be better uses for the Canadian Forces and
better political means of pursuing foreign policy
objectives than through continued military presence in
Europe of the then existing size. "300
"Defence arrangements must ... ensure respect for Canada's
sovereignty and territorial integrity, and. .. sustain
the confidence for the United States and other allies. "301
Defence in the 70s was an attempt by the Government to
describe the main elements of defense policy and place its
policy in the context of the National Aims and Policy Themes
established in Foreign Policy for Canadians . Canadians were
told that other challenges than armed attack might challenge
Canada's sovereignty and independence in the 1970s and that
"they could come both from outside and from within the
country .. .and. . .must therefore be a matter of first prior-
302lty." The White Paper also noted that the Armed Forces
provided an important reservoir of skills for national devel-
opment. "The Armed Forces make an important contribution to
Canada's unity and identity in a number of ways... they bring
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302Canada, Department of National Defence, Defence in the
70s; White Paper on Defence, p. 8.
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in scope and purpose ... they are distinctively Canadian.""1
Finally it stated that "a further objective of this policy
will be to promote greater involvement of the military in
the community, and to ensure that the community is aware of
the ways in which the military sector contributes to achiev-
i j -.304ing national arms and priorities.
One of the major statements in the White Paper was that
"the Canadian Forces have a major role to play in promoting
national unity... it is essential ... that they reflect the
bilingual and bicultural nature of the country." The
White Paper reviewed some of the steps taken in this direction.
Finally, there was the paper "Canada-U.S. Relations:
Options for the Future." This paper was especially impor-
tant since it was not issued until almost four years after
the foreign policy review began and two years after Foreign
Policy for Canadians was published. Thus any deviation in
the tenets of the two documents would have been of significance.
Additionally, a major perturbation occurred in the inter-
national system in the interim between the publishing of the








Mitchell Sharp, "Canada-U.S. Relations: Options for
the Future," International Perspectives , Special Issue,
(Autumn 1972) : 1-24.
307Norman Hillmer and Garth Stevenson, eds
.
, Foremost
Nation: Canadian Foreign Policy and a Changing World
(Toronto: McClelland and Steward, Ltd., 1977), p. 29.
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What was found however was a stand for the "Third Option"
that is essentially a restatement of the declarative policy
in Foreign Policy for Canadians and a logical development of
it. The "Third Option" was chosen in the context of
Canadian nation-building:
"Distinctness has no autonomous virtue of its own. It
is not an end in itself. In the process of nation-building,
however, it is a substantial factor of cohesion. In the
case of Canada, in particular, it is arguable that the
perception of a distinct identity can make a real and
discernable contribution to national unity...
If Canadians say they want a distinct country, it is
not because they think they are better than others. It
is because they want to do the things they consider im-
portant and do them in their own way. And they want
Canadian actions and lifestyles to reflect distinctly
Canadian perspectives and a Canadian view of the world."
It was exactly the same context associated with the earlier
foreign policy review.
Two major conclusions about the Trudeau Doctrine are in-
escapable from the preceding analysis. First, the Trudeau
Government's struggle against the divisive aspects of bicul-
tural nationalism, the central element of its domestic
policies, was accurately and consistently incorporated as
a major determinant of its foreign and defense policies.
Second, in spite of major intervening disruptions in the
international system and temporal separation of almost four
years, the domestic determinants of foreign policy remained
constant and consistent in their effect.




Two more major questions must be asked in this assessment
of the Trudeau Doctrine. Was the doctrine effectively and
consistently translated into actions within the foreign
policy and defense policy spheres? With what effect?
One major element of the defense policy was the implementa-
tion of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) Bilingualism Program.
Even though the Canadian Army had had one bilingual
regiment, the Royal 22nd Regiment (R22R) "Vandoos , " since
the First World War, and had formed the French language
College Militaire Royal at St. Jean in 1952 in the wake of
the Korean War, the Canadian Armed Forces received one of
the worst reports from the Royal Commission on Bilingualism
and Biculturalism when it issued Book III of its Report in
309September 1969. Prime Minister Trudeau had noted that "in
the federal civil service, for example, and even more so in
the Canadian armed forces, a French Canadian started off with
an enormous handicap - if indeed he managed to start at all."
Yet, by May 1976, the Commissioner of Official Languages had
cited the Department of National Defence for having the best
program for bilingualism in the federal government. What
had happened in the interim?
309 Canada, Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Bicul-
turalism, Book III, pp. 293-345; and Eayrs , p. 69.
Trudeau, Federalism and the French Canadians
, p. 4 7
Canada, House of Commons, SCEAND, Minutes of Pro-
ceedings and Evidence, 20 May 1976, No. 41, p. 8.
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The main objectives of the Department's bilingualism
development program were to serve the needs of both official
language groups in Canada with equal facility, provide equal
career opportunities and conditions of service for French-
Canadians, allow Francophones to pursue their career in
their mother tongue, and to ensure that the CAF represented
312
the national linguistic ratio at all levels in the Force."1
The first formal plan for the management of bilingualism in
the CAF was tabled in February 1971 and called for raising
the level of bilingualism from ten percent among the officers
to 40 percent by 1976 and 60 percent by 1930. For non-com-
missioned officers the objective was to progress from 20
percent bilingual in 1971 to 35 percent in 1976 and 55 per-
313
cent in 1980. The policy was revised in 1972 into its
314
current three-phase fifteen-year program. The objectives
were also expanded in 1972 to ensure that the linguistic and
cultural values of both language groups were reflected in
the CAF, to ensure that all internal communications of gen-
eral interest were prepared in both official languages, and
to assist the CAF in the acquisition of second language
312Canada, Department of National Defence, Defence 1972
,
p. 103.
313Canada, House of Commons, Debates , 2 6 February 1973,
pp. 3781-3783.
314 Canada, Department of National Defence, Directorate
of Official Languages, Program To Increase Bilingualism And
Biculturalism In The Canadian Armed Forces , P 1211-0 (DBPR)
,
7 April 19 72. The new quotas gave three breakout points
temporally and four divisions by rank.
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skills, and provide facilities for reinforcement and retention
C A U'H 315of acquired skills.
The primary programs to enhance bilingualism in the CAF
were French Language Units (FLU) , language training, and per-
sonnel administration. On 23 June 1970 the Prime Minister
announced that FLU's would be formed in the public service and
CAF. By 3 February 1971 the CAF had decided that 18 FLU's
would initially be established. They were to be manned by
Anglophones and Francophones with the internal language and
language of work to be French. The units retained a bilingual
317
communication capability for external transactions. In
February 1971 the 5th Combat Group, consisting of elements of
the Royal 22nd Regiment (R22R) , 12th Armored Regiment, a General
Headquarters and engineering elements were functioning as an
FLU as were the 1st Battalion, R22R in Europe, HMCS Ottawa
,
318
and the 433rd Squadron at Bagotville. In April 1975 a
second set of 18 FLU's were announced by the Minister of
319National Defence with manning to be completed by 19 73.
Ibid.
, pp . 1-2
Canada, House of Commons, Debates , 23 June 19 70, pp,
8487-8494.
3 1 7Canada, House of Commons, SCEAND, Minutes of Pro-
ceedings and Evidence , 3 February 1971, No. 15, pp. 17-21.
318
Ibid. The unit titles herein are translated.
FLU's may normally be recognized by their French language
titles
.
319Canada, House of Commons, SCEAND, Minutes of Pro-
ceedings and Evidence, 15 April 1975, No. 12, p. 39.
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The implementation of the CAF bilingualism program re-
quired a drastic adjustment of all CAF training programs. One
of the earliest adjustments was the introduction of FRANCOTRAIN,
a program which allowed Francophones to pursue technical
training in their native tongue. If English was ultimately
required in a billet, English language training followed tech-
320
nical training in French. The results were spectacular.
The rate of satisfactory technical training completion for
Francophone trainees jumped 4J_ percent, equalling the figures
for Anglophones, and spinning off benefits in retention of
321
Francophones. The Base Language Training Program (BLTP)
started in 1972 at 29 bases with 70 teachers and 1500 students.
The program provided one hour per day instruction and required
two hours per day self-study. Its availability was ultimately
322
expanded to over 6 8 bases. Formal language training was
provided at a consolidated CAF facility at St. Jean, P.Q. and
both of the primary military colleges phased into mandatory
323bilingual training.
320Canada, House of Commons, SCEAND, Minutes oof Pro-
ceedings and Evidence , 3 February 1971, no. 15, p. 17.
321Canada, Department of National Defence, Director Gen-
eral of Official Languages Speech to Command and Staff Col-
lege, Toronto, 14 April 1978, pp. 9-10.
322Canada, House of Commons, SCEAND, Minutes of Pro -
ceedings and Evidence , 22 May 1973, No. 13, p. 35.
323Canada, House of Commons, Debates 26 March 1976, p.
1145; and Canada, House of Commons, Debates , 24 March 1975,
p. 4417. Basic English: 23 weeks, Advanced English: 15
weeks, Formal French: 24 weeks. Some immersion training
is provided by the Public Service Commission for senior
personnel. Royal Roads Military College, which had only a
minor cadet output, did not offer bilingual training. It was
planned to phase out this institution.
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Personnel policies were modified in several ways to promote
bilingualism. Promotion opportunities (i.e. there were more
vacanies, not different standards for selection) were often
324better in Francophone units, and some adjustments to the
Promotion Merit Lists were made, generally only at the level of
Major and above, to meet national linguistic ratio require-
325
ments and for the "needs of the service." For officers
above the rank of Captain, the ability to speak a second
language became an element of merit in selection for promo-
3 2 6
tion. In addition to promotion opportunities, recruiting
goals and quotas were established to help reach and maintain
bilingualism goals. However, no differentiation by native
327
tongue was introduced into the enrollment standards.
Although some of the costs of the CAF bilingualism pro-
gram were identified in the annual Estimates , it was noted
as early as 1969 that "the cost of the bilingualism program
324 Canada, House of Commons, Debates , 4 February 1971,
pp. 3064-3065.
325Canada, House of Commons, Debates , 28 April 1976, pp.
12959-12960. The promotion of an officer who would have
otherwise been promoted is 'protected' against the next vacancy.
Some adjustments were also made among NCO ' s . Although the
adjustments are supposed to be made on the basis of language
proficiency, there is some evidence that they may have been
made on the basis of ethnic background as well. This would
have provided distinct advantages to ethnically French personnel
326 T,.,Ibid.
327Canada, House of Commons, Debates , 13 July 1977, p.
7624; Canada, House of Commons, SCEAND, Minutes of Proceed-
ings and Evidence , 20 May 1975, No. 23, pp. 11-32; and
Canada, House of Commons, SCEAND, Minutes of Proceedings and
Evidence, 28 March 1974, No. 6, p. 37.
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in the Canadian Forces cannot be accurately determined at
this time as records are not maintained in a manner which
3 2 8
would provide this date." The task of identifying costs
associated with the bilingualism program became more diff-
icult as the accounting objects categories and format of the
Estimates of the Minister of Finance changed three times be-
tween 1968 and 1978. Searches of the Department of Finance
Estimates , House of Commons Debates , and SCEAND Minutes of
Proceedings and Evidence provided enough evidence to make a
reasonable estimate of the costs in the early through mid-70s.
(This estimate assumed a five-year payout period for major
construction projects). Capital costs, primarily associated
with the Royal Military Colleges and the CFB St. Jean facil-
329lty were calculated to be about $22 million per annum.
The operating costs, which consisted primarily of wages, ad-
ministration, and tuition for dependents, were calculated to
be approximately $47 million per annum. During the period in
question, one of catastrophically dropping defense budgets and
reduced capital expenditures, approximately 3 percent of the
annual defense budget was eaten up by the bilingualism program.
This program expenditure was about 25 percent of the size of the
3 2 8 Canada, House of Commons, Debates , 26 March 1969, p.
7145.
329Translation costs whxch run ~.5 percent of a new pro-
curement package are included here also. For instance,
translation costs for the Aurora program were budgeted for
$5 million out of a $1 billion contract according to testi-
mony before SCEAND by B. Gen. Allan on 13 May 19 76.
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capital procurement budget and 350 percent of the NATO com-
mon infrastructure program contribution during this period.
Money spent on the CAF bilingualism program clearly sup-
ported the biculturalism objectives of the Trudeau government.
In 1968 less than 16 percent of the CAF were Francophones.
By mid-1977 that number had been increased to 23.3 percent of
332
the CAF. The FLU ' s rapidly expanded opportunities for
Francophones while FRANCOTRAIN improved their abilities to ex-
ploit those opportunities. The CAF were a model for the country
of the potential benefits of the federal language and culture
programs
.
While the CAF bilingualism program entered full swing
other facets of defense policy also began to yield domestic
benefits. In 1969 the Canadians had been engaged in an in-
ternal debate about the necessity for a strictly military
NATO alliance in a world they perceived as rapidly becoming
333
multipolar. Additionally tensions were running high in
Information for bilingualism costs were derived from
the following documents: Department of Finance Estimates
1967-68 through 1977-78; section 15 and supplemental esti-
mates; House of Commons Debates , (26 March 1969, pp. 106-107),
(24 March 1975, p. 4417), (30 May 1975, p. 6287), (10 May
1976, pp. 13342-13343), (26 October 1976, p. 464), (4 August
1977, p. 8010) ; and SCEAND Minutes of Proceedings and Evi -
dence (28 March 1973, p. 6:39), (22 May 1973, p. 15:35),
(15 April 1975, p. 12:39), (13 May 1975, p. 21:31), (20 May
1975, pp. 23:14, 23:32), (13 May 1976, p. 39:14).
331Canada, House of Commons, Debates , 25 April 196 8.
This was as low as nine percent in the Maritime Command.





Quebec and the separtist Parti Quebecois had recently begun
334 . .
to organize for its first election. The decision was made
to reduce Canada's NATO commitment by converting the Brigade
Group and Air Division to a half-sized, co-located, light,
335
air-mobile combat group. Its CF-104 squadrons were re-
lieved of their nuclear-strike role, and their tanks and
Honest John missiles were retired.
This policy change accomplished several objectives. First,
the defense expenditures associated with the force were re-
duced and became available for other uses. Second, it made
the roles and equipment for home and overseas based units
compatible and moved them toward a capability more consistent
with the growing political unrest at home and the growing CAF
337
commitment to internal security. Third, the rebasmg
allowed the Francophone units of the CAF to exercise with
3^3
their counterparts from the French Army. "" Finally, the
reduction in the NATO forces at a time when the public con-
sensus on their necessitv was low forestalled anv oolitical
334 Saywell, pp. 19-29.
335Canada, Department of National Defence, Defence in the
70s: White Paper on Defence
, pp. 32-38.
3 36
Ibid. The tanks were to be replaced by a light-wheeled
armored vehicle such as the British Scorpion.
337
Ibid.; and Cuthbertson, p. 237. Cuthbertson recounts
a growing number of practice alerts and a revision of internal
security doctrine, both made with the Quebec situation in
mind, from his own Army experience.
338Strome Galloway, Col., "Defence: The Great Canadian
Fairy Tale," Army Quarterly and Defence Journal , Vol. 102,
no. 4, (1972) : 422.
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advantage for the growing Parti Quebecois. The initial PQ
platform included the renunciation of NATO and NORAD , while
longterm military commitments outside of Canada had a history
of French-Canadian opposition. That opposition was a signi-
ficant factor in earlier foreign and defense policy formula-
339tion for Canadian ministers. The Prime Minister's
statement of 3 April 1969 stressed that the contribution of
the CAF to "supplementing the civil authorities and contri-
buting to national development" was their primary responsi-
bility while reaffirming the Canadian commitment to NATO and
stating that the Canadian NATO reductions were contingent
upon "the ability of European countries themselves to provide
necessary conventional defense forces and armaments to be
340deployed by the alliance in Europe." In Foreign Policy
for Canadians (Europe) , the basis for the conditional reduc-
tion of Canadian forces in NATO was further related to detente
and the "absense of concern about immediate physical secur-
341ity." The Trudeau government clearly recognized that
trade-offs were involved in their decision to stress domestic
determinants for foreign and defense policy and that the
preservation of Canadian security might, in changed
339Parti Quebecois, Official Program , 1970 Edition, p.
11; Pearson, Mike , Vol. II, p. 55; and Eayrs , p. 134.
340Canada, Department of External Affairs, Statements
and Speeches , No. 69/7.
341Canada, Department of External Affairs, Foreign
Policy for Canadians , Vol. II, p. 11.
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circumstances, require an upward revision in the Canadian
342
contribution to NATO.
Before the 1973 admission of Great Britain, Ireland, and
Denmark to the European Economic Community (EEC) , Canada had
not been a major trading partner of the EEC. Dramatically,
after 1973, Canada became a major supplier of wood pulp,
34 3
nickel, and iron to the EEC within a very short period.
In April 1974 the Canadian government first proposed a "con-
tractual link" between the EEC and Canada to place their
344
relations on a "juridical basis." After early resistance
on the part of some EEC members, particularly France, was
overcome, the EEC foreign ministers agreed in June 19 7 5 to
go ahead quickly with negotiations on the contractual link
and Canada and the EEC signed a framework agreement for com-
345
mercial and economic cooperation on 6 July 1976.
During the negotiations for the contractual link the West
German government commented, in early July of 1975, upon the
Canadian military contribution to NATO, especially the lack
of armor in the CAF. It was reportedly intimated that the
342Canada, Department of External Affairs, Foreign Policy
for Canadians , Vol. I, pp. 17,13; and Canada, Department of
External Affairs, Foreign Policy for Canadians , Vol. II,
p. 11.
343Canada, Department of External Affairs, European Com-





345 Ibid., p. 22 (Insert); Hillmer, pp. 32-35; and Peter
Regenstreif, "Canada's Foreign Policy," Current History , Vol.
72, no. 426, (April 1977): 152.
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acceptance of the "contractual link" by West Germany was
contingent upon Canadian revision of its NATO armor commit-
346
ment. The conventional view of the diplomacy surrounding
the "contractual link" holds that the Canadian government
folded under the German linkage between tanks and an EEC con-
tract, rapidly discarded the Trudeau Doctrine, and made a
forced march via the Defence Structure Review (DSR) back into
the military mainstream of the Atlantic Alliance after which
347foreign policy once again dictated defense policy.
There are however, problems with the conventional inter-
pretation. First, the approach back to NATO began almost
immediately after the scale-down of the Canadian military
commitment, and was not precipitously begun as a result of
the negotiations for a "contractual link." Canadians took
part in all of the political functions of NATO throughout
the early 19 70's and were principal participants in the
development, preparation, and execution of the Mutual and
Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks, the Conference on
Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) , and the Committee
346Hillmer, pp. 32-24; and Byers, "The Canadian Military,"
p. 182.
347
Byers, "Defense and foreign policy in the 1970s: the
demise of the Trudeau doctrine," pp. 332-338; Byers, "The
Canadian Military," pp. 182-183; and Regenstreif, "Canada's




on the Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS) . The Canadian
Minister of External Affairs, Mitchell Sharp, had begun making
349public conciliatory speeches as early as 1973, and the
rapprochement was virtually completed less than two months
after the initial aide-memoire by Canada on the contractual
link with the approval, on 19 June 19 74, and signing, at NATO
headquarters on 26 June 1974, of the Atlantic Declaration of
Ottawa.
A second critical problem with the conventional inter-
pretation is that it assumes that the DSR was initiated in
response to the German criticsms and reflects an abandon-
ment of the Trudeau Doctrine. In fact, the DSR had its roots
348NATO, NATO Information Service, NATO Facts and Figures
,
(Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1978)
, pp. 73-87, 101-
10 3; James R. Huntley, Man's Environment and the Atlantic
Alliance (Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1972), pp. 7-11;
Hillmer, pp. 37-62; W.B. Prendergast, Mutual and Balanced
Force Reduction (Washington, D.C.: A.E.I. , 1978); Canadian
Delegation to the Conference on Security and Co-operation in
Europe, "Implementation of the Final Act of the CSCE," Feb-
ruary 1977, pp. 1-3; Canadian Delegation to the North Atlan-
tic Treaty Organization, "Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions
(MBFR) , " March 1977, pp. 1-3; and Canadian Delegation to the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "The Committee on the
Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS)," July 1977, pp. 1-3.
349Canada, Department of External Affairs, Statements
and Speeches , No. 73/12.
350
"The Atlantic Declaration of Ottawa," International
Perspectives
, July/August 1974, pp. 46-48. The Declaration
stated, in part, that "...All members of the Alliance agree
that the continued presence of Canadian and substantial U.S.
forces in Europe plays an irreplaceable role in the defense
of North America as well as Europe..." and that "...The
members of the Alliance consider that the will to ensure their
common defense obliges them to maintain and improve the effi-
ciency of their forces and that each should undertake,
according to the role that it has assumed in the structure
of the Alliance, its proper share of the burden of maintain-
ing the security of all."
i ?fi

in the funding constraints of the early 1970' s and its prox-
imate cause was the receipt by the Department of National
Defence of its funding level for 1976/76 in the Fall of 1974.
Due to the combined effects of budgetary restraints, infla-
tion, and the rising percentage of personnel costs in the
budget several effects had been felt by the CAF; first was
a reduction in personnel, second was a reduction in capital
spending, third was an aging of equipment resulting in the
technical dating, and in some cases, obsolescence of equip-
ment. In 1974 these effects had reached critical propor-
tions as manpower declined to 78,000 at the same time that
projected requirements were rising, inflated by the expansion
of national jurisdictions forecast by United Nations Third
Law of the Sea Conference. At the time the Chief of the
Defence Staff, General Dextraze , informed the Minister of
National Defence that he could not reduce manpower below its
existing level without a grave loss of combat capability.
He further stated that any additional loss of combat capa-
bility should be undertaken only as a result of a basic change
in derense policy objectives.
The result of that confrontation was the DSR which was
ordered in December 1974 to review the tasks, organization,
R.M. Withers, Major-General, "Canadian Defence Require-
ments," Speech by the Associate Assistant Deputy Minister
(Policy) to the Royal Canadian Artillery Association, Febru-
ary 11, 1976 (Extracts), Canadian Defence Quarterly , Vol. 5,





and resources of the Canadian Forces. The review was con-
ducted in three phases. Phase One defined the tasks which
the CAF must perform based upon the current foreign and de-
fense policy or proposed Cabinet modification thereto. The
354Cabinet accepted 55 tasks.
Phase Two was completed in November 1975 and examined
optional force structures based upon the combat capability
demanded by the tasks identified in Phase One. Following
Phase Two of the DSR, the Government reaffirmed its commit-
ment to the four priorities for the CAF identified in Defence
in the 70s . Other major decisions taken by the Cabinet in-
cluded: maintenance of the CAF at a level of 73,000 Regular
and 22,000 Reserve Force personnel; the continued mainten-
ance in Europe of mixed air and land forces with adequate
equipment; replacement of the Argus maritime patrol aircraft
which had been in service since 19 57; and studies for new
fighter aircraft and ship replacement programs to be under-
taken by the Cabinet in 1976. 355
A significant improvement was made in the financial sit-
uation of the Department of National Defence by releasing
353Canada, Statistics Canada, Ministry of Industry,
Trade and Commerce, Canada Handbook
, (1978), p. 363; and
C.J. Marshall, "Canada's forces take stock in Defence Struc-
ture Review," International Perspectives , No. 1, (January/
February 1976): 26-30.
Ibid.
355 Ibid.; and Canada, House of Commons, Debates , 2 7
November 1975, pp. 9502-9507.
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the previously frozen budget and by deciding to compensate
future expenditures for personnel, operations, and mainten-
ance for the effects of inflation. Additionally the govern-
ment agreed, starting in fiscal year (FY) 76/77, to increase
the capital budget by 12 percent, in real terms, per annum
-3 cr /r
for the next five years. Phase Three of the DSR was a
review of the command and control, logistics, and training
357infrastructures required for the selected force model. J
The DSR was initiated because of conditions which arose
from the implementation of the Trudeau Doctrine, but it was
initiated over six months before the first West German
statements about the Canadian armor situation. Further, the
DSR was undertaken in reference to the defense priorities
enumerated in Defence in the 70s , and it reaffirmed the
validity of those priorities. While the DSR did result in a
shift in the Canadian position on tanks for its forces, and
an agreement to purchase 123 German-manufactured Leopard II
3 5 8
main battle tanks was completed in the Spring of 1976, no
other change was made in the size or role of the CAF contin-
gent for NATO. The conventional interpretation that the DSR
was the instrumentality for the abandonment of the Trudeau




Byers, "The Canadian Military," p. 182
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A third problem with the conventional interpretation is
that it assumes that the Canadian decision to purchase Leo-
pard II tanks was the factor which allowed a contractual link
with the EEC to be completed. While this undoubtedly had
some impact on German behavior, it was not the critical point
on which the completion of the "contractual link" turned.
The French were the primary impediment to the completion of
the "contractual link." When Prime Minister Trudeau returned
from his sixteen-day trip to Europe in March 19 7 5 he had
received promises of support for his "contractual link" in
359
every capitol but Pans. After the French withdrew their
objections to negotiations at the meeting of EEC foreign
ministers in Luxembourg in June 1975, the agreements for com-
mercial and economic cooperation were completed rapidly.
There is, finally, one important question that is not
adequately addressed by conventional interpretations but
which is central to any assessment of the Trudeau Doctrine
and the EEC "contractual link." What was the purpose of the
"contractual link"? Canada had smoothly functioning political
and economic links with the members of the EEC without a
"contractual link." These included EEC association through
the Commonwealth, the NATO consultative network, the
359Hillmer, p. 33. Thus, West German agreement to the





Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
,
and the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) . These
contacts bely the conventional answer that Canada sought
consultative rights . Another conventional answer is that
Canada sought to shift its exports to the EEC out of the
resources sector, but it was clear before the initiative that
the EEC members had no such interest and would resist any
attempt to do so. At any rate, the "contractual link" did
not accomplish the shift to manufactured goods. Finally,
Canada had previously been opposed to enlargement of the
3 6 2
EEC because it tended to divert trade away from Canada.
The reasons for the installation of a redundant vehicle
for consultation and the reversal of previous Canadian policy
can be found in the domestic determinants context of the
Trudeau Doctrine. Canadian authorities had advised Great
Britain by 1970 of the possible impact on Canadian exports
of British accession to the EEC and had urged the establish-
ment of consultation procedures before, during, and after
negotiations on accession. The British accommodated the
request and the result was that Britain brought a large number
3 61
Hillmer, p. 28; Roger Hill, Political Consultation in
NATO (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs,
1978), pp. 112-133; A. LeRoy Bennet, International Qrganiza-
tions: Principles and Issues (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1977), pp. 316-317; and Anthony J.C.
Kerr, The Common Market and How It Works (New York; Pergamon
Press, 1977), pp. 144, 156-159.
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of the Commonwealth states into association with the EEC on
364its accession. The increased trade for Canada which re-
sulted from this approach to British accession significantly
fostered economic growth in Canada and enhanced Canada's
ability to be an entity distinct from the United States. In
the wake of the American revision of trade policies and the
proclamation of the "Third Option" in 1972, the Canadian
association with the EEC became more and more attractive.
The "contractual link" also had two other domestic bene-
fits for Canada. First, a juridical basis for the Canada-EEC
relationship, beyond its Commonwealth association with Great
Britain, would complicate any attempt by a schismatic Quebec
government to push rapidly for independence. The major
commodities traded between Canada and the EEC originated in
Quebec, but were transhipped, with essential intermediate
*3 g* e
processing, from Ontario or the Mar i times. Thus rapid
independence on the part of Quebec could economically threaten
the EEC as well as the rest of Canada.
Finally, the Canadian "contractual link," by its close
association, in the popular mind, with NATO membership tended
to reinvigorate the NATO relationship for French-Canadians.
This, along with the apparent failure of the CSCE Helsinki
Accords to yield any changes in Soviet Bloc behavior, the
364
Kerr, The Common Market and How It Works, pp. 8-13,
22-26.
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apparent deadlock in the MBFR talks, and the dramatic build-
up of Warsaw Pact forces resulted in a major change in the
1978 Edition of the Parti Quebecois program. The promises
to scrap NATO and NORAD out of hand were deleted and replaced
3 6 6by a commitment only to re-evaluate military alliances.
Other developments in Canadian defense policy during the
period 1968-1978 also reflected the continuing and effective
existence of the Trudeau Doctrine rather than its demise and
a return to traditional foreign and defense policies . One
effective indication was that the Department of National
Defence continued to reiterate the priorities of Defence in
3 6 7
the 7 0s in each of its annual reports. Additionally it
explained the development of Department of National Defence
Tasks and Objectives from the National Aims and Policy Themes
of Foreign Policy for Canadians and presented its annual report
3 6 8
of defense activities in that context. ' There would obvi-
ously be no need to do this if the Trudeau Doctrine had been
discarded.
The "Third Option" objective "of living distinct from but
in harmony with... the United States" has been continuously
reflected in the relations between the United States and
Canada concerned with NORAD between 1968-1978. Special
3 66
Parti Quebecois, Official Program , 1978 Edition, p. 12
Anticipation of U.S. reaction to independence may have also
played a role.







hearings were held on the renewal of the NORAD agreement in
3691969, 1973, and 1975. The agreement was renewed, with
slight modification, on 30 March 1968, extended without
change for two years on 10 May 1973, and renewed for five
years on 8 May 1975. During the ten-year period in ques-
tion changes in NORAD operating procedures were made to
assure that Canadian personnel were replaced immediately if
the United States unilaterally placed its armed forces in a
371higher state of alert or vice versa. Additionally safe-
guards were enhanced to assure that Canadian government
approval is obtained before Canadian aircraft are armed with
nuclear air-to-air missiles or before CINCNORAD deploys
American aircraft in a higher alert status than the CAF over
372Canadian territory. Finally, both governments began
developing national radar systems for joint civil and military
use. Because of this negotiation a change to NORAD regional
alignments was begun. Additional construction in Canada is
required before the realignment is complete, but it will
eventually result in the exclusive peacetime surveillance
of Canadian territory by the CAF with control functions over
373Canada predominantly executed by the CAF. The Canadian
369Canada, House of Commons, SCEAND, Minutes of Proceed-
ings and Evidence , 22 April 1975, No. 14, p. 14:4.
Ibid., p. 5; and Cuthbertson, p. 91.
371Canada, House of Commons, SCEAND, Minutes of Proceed-
ings and Evidence , 22 April 1975, No. 14, p. 14:8.
3 "72 x , . ,Ibid.
373 Ibid., pp. 14:8-9, 14:25-26.
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decisions which have culminated in increased separation of
national functions within NORAD have turned upon the percep-
tions that the air defense of North America has become a
weak fourth priority for NORAD and that a resurgence of the
4-u 4- • i -i i 374air threat is very unlikely.
The continuation of the Trudeau Doctrine is reflected in
Canadian procurement programs, the Defence Services Program
(DSP). The New Fighter Aircraft (NFA) program provides a
case in point. The evaluation plan for the NFA has two basic
decision criteria: military cost-effectiveness and indus-
375trial benefits. Both of these decision elements have
significant domestic elements as determinants. Industrial
benefits involves a requirement by the Canadian government
that a substantial part of its capital expenditure abroad be
returned home in the form of technical and economic benefits
to the domestic industry, thereby simultaneously reducing
the balance of payments imbalance and providing new capital
1 7 ft
flows, employment, and technology for Canadian industries.
The benefits packages offered by the manufacturers are con-
sidered in three categories, benefits for the Canadian
374
Ibid., pp. 14:6-7, 14:26; and Cuthbertson, pp. 97,
100. It is interesting however that these hearings consider-
ed the possibility of a cruise missile threat, and as early
as 1969 SCEAND had considered the susceptibility of the DEW
line to air launched, short range, cruise missile attack.
375
P.D. Manson, "Managing the New Fighter Aircraft Pro-
gram," Canadian Defence Quarterly , Vol. 7, no. 4, (Spring
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tices. See McLin in this regard.
376 Ibid., p. 12.
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aerospace sector, benefits for other defense related manu-
377facturers, and benefits for general manufacturing. The
importance of this decision element is reflected by the fact
that the competition was extended by the addition of a semi-
final short-list selection in order to encourage the manu-
37 8facturers to increase their industrial benefits package.
The domestic elements of the military cost-effectiveness
decision element are reflected in the specifications for air-
to-air performance and air-to-surface performance specified
in the original Request For Proposals and the Operational
Effectiveness Evaluation criteria. These specifications and
criteria are formulated with respect to the priorities and
379tasks assigned by Defence in the 70s and the DSR.
The final way in which domestic determinants shaped
Canadian defense policy was in the special attention given
to the inculcation of federal loyalty among members of the
CAF and the formation of a CAF unit with enhanced capabil-
ities for control of civil insurrection. The election of the
Parti Quebecois brought the possibility of an independent
Quebec one step closer to reality in 1976. By 1977 many
junior officers and enlisted Francophone members of the CAF
377 T,.,Ibid.
378
"Canada Picks F16 and F18A as Finalists in Competition
to Become Its New Fighter," The Wall Street Journal , 24
November 1978.
379
Ibid.; and J. Saywell, ed., Canadian Annual Review of
Politics and Public Affairs 1975 (Toronto: Canadian Insti-
tute of International Affairs, 1976), p. 299.
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were beginning to think about how this might affect their
38futures. This concern had obviously penetrated the higher
levels of the Department of National Defence some time
earlier. On 26 February 1971 Donald MacDonald, Minister of
National Defence, told Commons, "...certain French-speaking
units, particularly those based on Valcartier, protected the
security of Canada very well last October and November — and
the policy of bilingualism put forward here is to assure
that that same loyalty and opportunity will exist in the
3 81forces in the future." By March of 1977 the concern for
the loyalty of Francophone members of the CAF had become much
more acute. Late in that month General J. A. Dextraze, the
Chief of the Defence Staff, visited the base at Valcartier
to address a group of soldiers. A PQ candidate had received
a majority of the votes cast at Valcartier in the 15 November
38 21976 election. "I am a citizen who feels deeply in his
heart the need to protect the priceless values which the
army has always safeguarded by cementing Canadian unity,"
i -a 383he said.
3 8
"Plusiers militaires s'inquietent du sort des Forces
armees dans un Quebec independant , " Le Droit (Ottawa),
31 March 1977; and "Les militaires quebecois s ' interrogent ,
"
Le Soleil (Quebec City), 30 March 1977.
381Canada, House of Commons, Debates , 26 February 1971,
p. 3783.
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"Defence chief asks loyalty from soldiers in Quebec,"
Sun (Vancouver), 30 March 1977; and R. Desgagne, "General
Dextraze Appeals to the Patriotism of Citizens in Uniform,"




The concern stated by General Dextraze at Valcartier was
reflected in one of his last acts as Chief of Defence Staff.
On 1 April 1977 he directed the formation of a new branch in
the CAF, the Special Service Force (SSF) , which was fully
384
constituted by the end of August. The 3,500-man SSF was
formed from the 1,000-man Canadian Airborne Regiment, former-
ly stationed in Edmonton, plus a helicopter squadron, and
3 8 5
units of artillery, light armored vehicles, and engineers.
3 8 6
It was stationed in Petawawa, Ontario. A controversy
arose about the nature of the tasking of the SSF after Tory
MP Allan McKinnon suggested that its location, training, and
equipment indicated that it was tasked with the suppression
3 8 7
of large-scale riots and insurrection in Quebec. While
Defence Ministry officials denied that the SSF was targeted
against Quebec, they did admit that the SSF troops were
"special" and that "responding to requests for help from
3 8 8
civil authorities is a main function of the special force."
These two events clearly demonstrated that domestic deter-
minants associated with the protection of sovereignty and
384
"Ottawa denies Quebec role for new force," The Globe
and Mail (Toronto), 31 August 1977.
3 85 Ibid.; R. Linney, "'Special Troops' Now Camped on
PQ Border," Sunday Express , 4 September 1977; and R. MacGre-
gor, "The armed forces: in from the cold," Macleans
,
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maintenance of internal security, key elements of the Trudeau
Doctrine, were important considerations in Canadian defense






As a Canadian of French and Scottish extraction and
sometime political philosopher, Pierre Trudeau was uniquely-
suited to become Prime Minister in Canada in 1968. He
inherited a domestic political situation in which the French-
Canadian nation was finding, a century after confederation,
the economic and political tools for the realization of
their cultural and linguistic aspirations. He clearly per-
ceived the threat posed by politicized bicultural nationalism
in the Canadian body politic to national unity and the sur-
vival of federal institutions in Canada and had an immense
dedication, based in his philosophy, to the preservation of
Canadian unity and institutions. Trudeau entered politics
solely to preserve the Canadian federation from schism along
national lines and his singlemindedness of purpose carried
over into all areas of policy formulation.
In the fields of foreign and defense policy Trudeau
shifted Canadian policies away from their traditional inter-
national foci and insisted that they support the objectives
of domestic policies: national unity and the survival of
federal institutions in Canada. His revision, known as the
"Trudeau Doctrine," was stated as declarative policy in three
basic documents, Foreign Policy for Canadians , Defence in the
7 0s, and "Canada-U.S. Relations: Options for the Future."
14Q

Contemporary analysts of Canadian defense policy such
as Byers, Cuthbertson, Douglas, and Gray have established a
consensus that the Trudeau Doctrine was unable to respond
to changing circumstances in the international arena and was
abandoned by late 1976. By early 1979, however, the elements
of the Trudeau Doctrine had been reiterated as policy founda-
tions several times, no replacement policy had been announced,
and the Trudeau Doctrine had not been repudiated by the
Government. A close re-examination of defense policy between
1968 and 1978 showed several problems with the present con-
sensus about the demise of the Trudeau Doctrine. The CAF
,
for example, started up and continued throughout this period
a program to develop institutional bilingualism which
clearly reflected the vitality of the Trudeau Doctrine and
its domestic determinants. The 1969 cuts in Canadian forces
assigned to NATO were demonstrated to reflect Trudeau 's
domestic objectives accurately. The consensus of contempor-
ary analysts suggested that the search for a "contractual
link" with the EEC was successful only because of the aban-
donment of Trudeau' s domestic objectives, in the foreign
and defense policy spheres, and the reassertion of the pri-
macy of international considerations such as NATO. Re-
examination shows that some of the assumptions and premises
of the contemporary analysts are invalid and certain conclu-
sions emerge in contradistinction to their consensus:
1. The "contractual link" served primarily domestic
objectives and incidentally the NATO rapprochement.
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2. The "contractual link" probably would have occurred
without the purchase of German manufactured tanks.
3. Neither the employment nor the size of the Canadian
contingent to NATO were significantly affected by
the NATO rapprochement, the EEC "contractual link,"
or the DSR.
The re-examination of Canadian defense policy found additional
evidence to support the continued vigor of the Trudeau Doc-
trine between 1968-1978 in the development of NORAD, the
procurement of the New Fighter Aircraft, and the formation
of the Special Service Force.
What are the implications of continued operation of the
Trudeau Doctrine for NATO and North American defense? First
and foremost, this implies that Canada's political problems
with bicultural nationalism remain unresolved. So long as
this state of affairs exists, Canadian energies will be
turned primarily inward and low priority given to questions
involving NATO or North American defense. The domestic
incentives to manipulate defense and foreign policy will
remain high and policy may be expected to be variable. Where
policies have evolved toward maximum support of cultural
goals, resistance to change will be especially high. In
North American defense, for example, Canadians would have
a large incentive, after gaining relative autonomy in the
operation of NORAD, to resist re-evaluation of the air attack
threat should the Backfire bomber or long range cruise
missiles become a major threat to the continent. Similarly,
Canadians could be expected to resist any suggestions for
enlargement of its military forces in Europe on strictly
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military grounds. The low priorities for external concerns
might minimize the interest that Canadian policy makers would
demonstrate in the political affairs on NATO and North
American defense.
As long as Canadian bicultural nationalism is unresolved
the threat of secession by Quebec remains. Such an eventual-
ity would, at best, entail a period of mild uncertainty for
NATO and NORAD . The potential results are much more sober-
ing. Separation of Quebec from Canada could result in econ-
omic dislocations in both the United States and Europe. All
of the bilateral agreements between Canada and the United
States could be subject to renegotiation. These could
include, for instance, mutual defense arrangements as well
as boundary and trade agreements
.
The potential political and economic destabilization of
Canada would be an invitation to manipulation by other
powers from within and outside Canadian alliance structures.
Neither Europe nor the Soviet Union, for instance, would
desire to see a fragmented Canada slip into American absorp-
tion. Americans, on the other hand, would be very uneasy
should Quebec or English Canada decide to pursue a policy of
neutrality and exclude American utilization of their terri-
tory for strategic defense.
Ultimately, the extension of the Trudeau Doctrine implies
an increased threat of civil war in Canada. In Canada
regional, language, and cultural cleavages tend to reinforce
one another making resolution of problems difficult.
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In historical case studies of federations, the process of
disintegration was found to be most irreversible when poli-
ticization occurred and the satisfaction of competing demands
became regarded as a zero-sum game. In almost all cases this
38 9led to civil war. Recent polls of the Canadian populace
have demonstrated that a majority of the Canadian populace
would be willing to utilize force against Quebec if it
attempted to secede and enlarge its territory (a long-
standing plank of the PQ is to reclaim Labrador and extend
its Arctic territory) or attempted to restrict commerce
390in the St. Lawrence Seaway. In this respect Canadian
bicultural nationalism is potentially a most potent threat
to the security of the North American heartland, and by
extension, to the members of the North Atlantic Alliance.
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Richard Simeon, ed. Must Canada Fail? (Montreal: McGill-
Queen's University Press, 1977), pp. 42-60.
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